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FACTBOUND AND SPLITLESS:
THE CERTIORARI PROCESS AS BARRIER TO
JUSTICE FOR INDIAN TRIBES
Matthew L.M. Fletcher*
The Supreme Court's certiorari process does more than help the Court parse
through thousands of "uncertworthy" claims-the Court's process creates an
affirmative barrier to justice for parties like Indian tribes and individual Indians.
The Court has long maintained that the certiorari process is a neutral and
objective means of eliminating patently frivolous petitions from consideration. But
this empirical study of 163 preliminary memoranda, recently made available when
Justice Blackmun's papers were opened, demonstrates that the Court's certiorari
process is neither objective nor neutral. The research, reflecting certiorari
petitions filed during October Term 1986 through 1993, demonstrates that
statistically, there is a near zero chance the Supreme Court will grant a certiorari
petition filed by tribal interests. At the same time, the Court grants certiorari to far
more petitions filed by opponents of tribal sovereignty.
INTRODUCTION
Professor Edward Hartnett once asserted that the certiorari process, which
defines the Supreme Court's power to decide its own docket, "has had a profound
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role in shaping our substantive constitutional law."1 The power to choose a few
select cases among several thousand petitions each year is an awesome power.
Hartnett challenged future scholars to perform an empirical analysis of the impact
of the certiorari process on substantive constitutional law. There are a growing
number of empirical studies of the Supreme Court's agenda-setting through the
certiorari process, 2 but few scholars have examined the impact of the certiorari
process on a substantive area of constitutional law. This Article takes up that
challenge.
3
To meet Hartnett's challenge, this Article reviews 163 preliminary
memoranda written by Supreme Court clerks in the certiorari decision-making
process (the "cert pool memos") 4 during the 1986 through the 1993 docket years,
memoranda only recently made public in the Digital Archive of the Papers of
Justice Harry A. Blackmun.5 The Article only studies memos from federal Indian
law cases.6 A study of the cert pool memos in a single subject area offers unique
possibilities. It is, after all, the Supreme Court clerks who serve as the first
gatekeeper to the Supreme Court. Moreover, the influence of the cert pool memo
in moving a case onto the Court's "discuss list" and then to certiorari is critical, yet
understudied.7 In most instances, the cert pool memos are the only writing from
the Court discussing the cases in which the Court denies certiorari. Studies show
that when the author of a cert pool memo recommends denial, other Justices'
clerks generally spend little or no time arguing to grant certiorari. 8
1. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1731 (2000).
2. E.g., VANESSA BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: How JUSTICES
AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA (2007); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); Lee Epstein,
Jeffrey A. Segal & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States
Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002); Joseph
Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING 111 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963).
3. Cf Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1732 (noting how the certiorari process has
affected the development of incorporation theory).
4. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda
Building in the Supreme Court, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 807, 811 (1990) (describing the "cert
pool" and the memoranda that originate there).
5. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Digital Archive of the
Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun (2007), http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunArchive.html.
6. This number excludes seven cert pool memos analyzing unpaid petitions.
7. Previous scholarship on the "discuss list" did not study the cert pool
memoranda, perhaps because it largely was unavailable. E.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra
note 4. Research on the Blackmun digital archive is nascent. See, e.g., Ryan Schoen & Paul
J. Wahlbeck, The Discuss List and Agenda-Setting on the Supreme Court (Mar. 5, 2007), 1 st
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=912783.
8. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEx. L. REv. 947, 974 (2007) ("[B]ecause
recommendations to deny are the norm, law clerks pay far less attention to those
recommendations than to recommendations to grant during the annotation process,
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Federal Indian law was a natural choice of focus, not only because of this
author's experience in the subject matter, but also because of the fortuitous timing
of the memos' release. Something extraordinary has been happening in federal
Indian law. From 1959, the generally recognized beginning of the modem era of
federal Indian law,9 to 1987, when the Supreme Court decided the major Indian
gaming case California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,'0 Indians and Indian
tribes (to whom this Article will often call "tribal interests") won nearly 60% of
federal Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court." But since Cabazon,
tribal interests have lost more than 75% of their cases. The sample under
study-from 1986 to 1993-covers the first years of this radical turnaround.
Consistent with the overall pattern of the period, tribal interests lost about 75% of
their cases during the period under study.
The research presented in this Article reveals powerful evidence that the
Supreme Court's certiorari process harshly discriminates against the interests of
Indian tribes and individual American Indians. During the period analyzed in this
study--October Terms (OT) 1986 through 1993-the Supreme Court granted
certiorari once out of ninety-two Indian tribe and tribal interest petitions
(excluding three unpaid in forma pauperis prisoner petitions involving indigent
Indians in which the Court granted certiorari). 12 During the same period of time,
the Court granted certfourteen times out of a mere thirty-seven petitions filed by
states and local units of government against tribal interests-more than a third of
the petitions. Other petitioners opposing tribal interests did not fare as well as state
governments, but the Court still granted their petitions significantly more often
than tribal parties (four grants out of twenty-eight petitions). This difference is
statistically significant. 3 Because so few tribal petitions are granted, and relatively
so many petitions filed by opposing parties are granted, the number of cases where
a tribal party is the respondent-and at a clear disadvantage statistically-is
overwhelming.
increasing the likelihood that an issue of importance will be overlooked.") (citing PERRY,
supra note 2, at 63).
9. According to Charles Wilkinson, the "modem era" of federal Indian law
began in 1959 with the Court's decision in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1(1987).
10. 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding that the State of California had no authority to
regulate the high-stakes bingo operations of the Cabazon Band).
11. See Turtle Talk Blog, Supreme Court, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/
supreme-court-indian-law-cases/ (listing all the federal Indian law Supreme Court cases and
their outcomes since 1959).
12. There are two major classes of cert petitions-paid and unpaid. "Paid
petitions" are petitions filed by parties with the means to pay the filing fee, while "unpaid
petitions" are filed by parties without the means to pay the filing fee, often referred to as in
forma pauperis (IFP) petitions.
13. A chi-square analysis is used to evaluate the associations between categories
by determining whether differences in the observed frequencies and the expected
frequencies may be the result of chance. A chi-square analysis indicated that the difference
between these two groups is statistically significant and thus unlikely to be due to chance,
X2(l, N = 129) = 34.68,p < .01. (Chi square analysis on file with author.)
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Table 1
Cert Petition Success by Party: OT 1986-1993
70
60
50
u 40
30
20
10
Tribal State U.S.(1 of 92) (14 of 37) (3 of 5)
Table 2
Party as Petitioner: OT 1986-1993
~U.S.
i Other
- State
The import, of course, of a grant of certiorari is that the Court has agreed
to review a lower court decision adverse to the petitioner. It is well-established that
the Court grants certiorari and reverses the lower court decision far more than it
affirms. 14 Of the twenty-two petitions granted, the tribal interest was a respondent
in twenty of the cases, was the petitioner once, and was not present once.
The bare statistics are incredible. The question remains-how does the
Court's certiorari process discriminate so wildly against tribal interests? The
Supreme Court's certiorari process, which includes the clerks that do much of the
Court's work, discriminates against Indians and Indian tribes in two ways. First,
the Court undervalues the merits and importance of petitions filed by tribal
interests. Second, the Court overvalues the merits and importance of petitions filed
by the traditional opponents of tribal interests-state governments and, to a lesser
extent, the federal government and private entities. In shorthand, if a tribe or an
14. See Harvard Law Review, The Supreme Court-The Statistics, 122 HARV. L.
REv. 516, 524 (2008) (reporting that the Supreme Court reversed or vacated forty-five cases
while affirming only twenty-two in the 2007 Term). Cf generally S. Sidney Ulmer, The
Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to Decision "On the Merits," 4 POLITY 429
(1972).
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Indian loses in the federal courts of appeal, the Court will almost never review the
case, but if a state loses against a tribe or an Indian, the Court often grants
certiorari. This imbalance skews the development of federal Indian law doctrine.
Emblematic of how the certiorari process undermines tribal interests is
Elliott v. Vermont.' 5 Elliott is a case about aboriginal hunting and fishing rights of
the Abenaki people. The cert pool memowriter recommended that the Court deny
the petition because it was both factbound and splitless, as are nearly all Indian
treaty claims. 16 But the memowriter acknowledged that the petitioners had a valid
claim. The Vermont Supreme Court applied the wrong standard-in fact, that
court had created a new common-law standard out of whole cloth-and the court
had refused to consider important evidence favoring the exercise of the aboriginal
rights. Despite a strong showing that the lower court had committed reversible
error, the Supreme Court denied the petition.
This Article argues that the certiorari decisions made by the Supreme
Court tend to prejudice tribal interests because the entire certiorari
process-especially the participation of the clerks-slants the Court's certiorari
decisions against tribal interests in subtle but unmistakable ways. It would be
tempting to argue that the Supreme Court's agenda has shifted from more of a
balance of tribal and non-tribal interests since 1987 to an agenda that is opposed to
tribal interests on most levels. This Article, backed with empirical support drawn
from the cert pool memos, offers a theory different than mere agenda-setting: that
the certiorari process itself creates conditions that lead the Supreme Court to
accept cases that are likely to be decided against tribal interests.
Elliott is a good example of how the certiorari process and the cert pool
create conditions that prejudice tribal interests. Elliott is typical of cases that arise
between tribal interests and others; namely, that conflict arises out of attempted
enforcement of Indian treaty rights and the subsequent exclusion of state law and
regulation. Critically, memowriters recognize that tribal claims are usually based
on a single treaty or statute grounded deep in American history. 17 The treaty's
terms and history are bound to a particular territory,' 8 so a law clerk would be
hard-pressed to argue that the case has national implications. Because Indian law
cases have limited territorial reach, splits in lower court authority are unlikely.
Jurisdictional splits are the most important objective factor favoring a grant of
certiorari. Moreover, these cases are complex and involve "factbound"
applications of settled law. The petitioner is therefore praying the Court to correct
a lower court error applying rules of law previously determined by the Supreme
15. 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (No. 92-877).
16. Cert Pool Memo at 13-14, Elliott v. Vermont, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
(No. 92-877), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1992/Denied-pdf/92-877.pdf ("The case is sui generis .... ).
17. E.g., Cert Pool Memo at 7, W. Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini,
506 U.S. 822 (1992) (No. 91-1916), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/91-1916.pdf.
18. E.g., Cert Pool Memo at 7, Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington,
507 U.S. 1051 (1993) (No. 92-1445), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/B lackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/92-1445.pdf.
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Court. This, according to the Court's own rules, it will rarely do. Finally, as
memowriters demonstrate time and again, the cert pool members assume tribal
interests are not important to their audience.
The first part of this Article provides a short description of the certiorari
process and, in particular, the cert pool. It describes the origins of the Court's
discretionary docket and the modem certiorari process. Part I will also introduce
Supreme Court Rule 10 (Rule 10), which lists the subjective and objective factors
the Court uses to decide whether or not to grant a petition for certiorari. It
continues by describing cert pool mechanics and how they relate to the "discuss
list' 9 and the Conference, where the Justices privately meet to deliberate on
whether or not to grant certiorari in a given case.
Part II offers a historical review of modem Indian law during the study
time period. The beginning of the period under study reflects not only the early
Rehnquist Court, but the start of a major yet subtle change in the Court's Indian
law decisions. Specifically, from 1959's Williams v. Lee20 to 1987's California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,2 1 the Court's rulings favored tribal interests a
majority of the time. Since Cabazon, however, the Court has changed course,
ruling against tribal interests most often. In fact, consistent with recent decades,
during the eight years of this study, the Court ruled in favor of tribal interests only
one-quarter of the time.
Part III is the heart of the study. Here, the Article offers an extensive,
qualitative examination of the Court's certiorari decisions during the eight year
period. The analysis begins with the text of Rule 10, which divides the Court's
decision-making factors into four main categories: (1) splits in authority;
(2) importance; (3) gross error by lower courts; and (4) the factual character of the
dispute. The vast majority of Indian law certiorari petitions are denied because
they are "splitless" and "factbound." It appears from cert pool memos that clerks
recommend denial of tribal cert petitions because the decision-making factors
almost always weigh against tribal interests. The study demonstrates that the
certiorari process, often considered the linchpin to the Supreme Court's agenda-
setting, does more than merely set the Court's docket. The certiorari process drives
the Court toward accepting Indian law cases weighted against tribal interests.
Not only does Rule 10 prejudice tribal interest petitions, but the research
indicates that the Supreme Court favors some substantive issues over others. The
study demonstrates the Court's special dispensation against tribal interests.
Supreme Court clerks with little institutional memory, little knowledge of
American Indian history, and working in a "culture" of certiorari denial, almost
19. The "discuss list" is the list of cert petitions generated by the Chief Justice
and circulated amongst the Justices prior to each Conference. Any Justice can add a petition
to the discuss list. If a petition does not reach the discuss list, it is effectively "dead." For a
history of the "discuss list" and how it derived from the "dead list," see Caldeira & Wright,
supra note 4, at 809-15.
20. 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that a state court has no jurisdiction over a
civil claim arising in Indian Country brought by a non-Indian plaintiff against an Indian
defendant).
21. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
AA
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never recommend a grant to petitions filed by tribal interests. Moreover, the clerks
rarely find that tribal interests are of national legal importance sufficient to attract
the interest of the Court. Impressively, the comparative interests of the states
opposing tribes are often deemed-without discussion-important.
I. THE CERTIORARI PROCESS
A. The Origins of the Modern Certiorari Process
The modem certiorari process originated in the 1925 Judges' Bill, 22 in
which Chief Justice Taft argued to create a discretionary docket for the Supreme
Court.23 This grant of discretion was to lighten the Court's workload, which had
become overwhelming. As the Court's backlog of cases grew, its decisions slowed
to a snail's pace, taking "eighteen to twenty-four months for the Court to reach a
case on its docket.,
24
B. The Mechanics of Modern Certiorari Decision-Making
The way the Supreme Court decides to accept a petition for certiorari has
25 26long been a virtual mystery, except perhaps to those involved in the process.
What is known is that the Court grants cert in only a handful of
cases--often less than 100 a year-out of over several thousand petitions filed
each Term.27 When a litigant receives an adverse judgment from a federal court of
appeal or the highest court of a state judiciary, the party may seek Supreme Court
review. To do so, it must file a petition for certiorari with the Court-a "cert
petition." Opposing parties may file an opposition-a "cert opposition" or "cert
opp." Even amici may file briefs at this time.28 Each of the Supreme Court Justices
hires clerks-usually recent law school graduates with some experience in lower
22. Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936.
23. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1660-1704.
24. Chief Justice Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, Address to the American
Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), reprinted in HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1403, 1403 (1953); see also Letter of Chief
Justice Hughes to Sen. Burton Wheeler (Mar. 21, 1937), reprinted in HART & WECHSLER,
supra, at 1399, 1401 ("No single court of last resort, whatever the number of judges, could
dispose of all the cases which arise in this vast country and which litigants would seek to
bring up if the right of appeal were unrestricted."); Margaret Meriwether Cordray &
Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme
Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 392 (2004).
25. Cf Stras, supra note 8, at 947 (referencing "the shroud of secrecy
surrounding the Court"); Ulmer, supra note 14, at 432-33 (critiquing the Court's "[s]ecret
decision making").
26. Cf Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1501, 1526
(2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court bar, often former clerks, dominates advocacy before
the Court).
27. E.g., Harvard Law Review, supra note 14, at 523 (reporting that the Court
considered over 8374 certiorari petitions and granted 95 during the 2006 Term).
28. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 4, at 816 (asserting that amicus briefs at
the certiorari stage are critical to providing hints to the Court about the importance of a
case).
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federal courts-who review all the cert petitions, cert oppositions, and amicus
briefs. The clerks prepare a short memorandaum, formally known as a
"preliminary memorandum," in which they summarize the facts, the procedural
history, and the claims of the parties. They include a short discussion with candid
commentary on the relative merits of the petitions and recommend the Court either
grant or deny the petition. In some instances, especially when the federal
government has an interest or special expertise in an area of law addressed by a
cert petition (federal Indian law being a prime example), they recommend that the
Court seek input from the United States, represented by the Solicitor General-
Call for the Views of the Solicitor General (CVSG).29
Seven of the nine current Justices (Justices Alito and Stevens excluded)
participate in what is known as the "cert pool," whereby the law clerks are
assigned a docket number and asked to write a preliminary memorandum
(colloquially known as a cert pool memo) about the petition.30 During the period
addressed by this study-the 1986 through the 1993 Terms-fewer Justices
participated in the pool. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and, as noted above, Stevens,
did not participate, although they each received copies of every cert pool memo. 31
The cert pool memos are the Court's first take on whether a case is
"certworthy," an internal term of art that can be best defined by referring to
Supreme Court Rule 10, which governs the exercise of judicial discretion the
Court is allowed when making certiorari decisions. Rule 10 indicates that the
Court will review petitions for numerous factors, including: (1) whether "a United
States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; 3 2
(2) whether "a United States court of appeals... has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; 33
29. Professor Stras helpfully listed the various miscellaneous actions that a cert
pool memo could recommend: "The most common variations... included CVSG (call for
the views of the Solicitor General), Summary Reverse, Summary Affirm, CFR (call for a
response), CFRecord (call for the record), Hold, and GVR (grant, vacate, and remand)."
Stras, supra note 8, at 978 n.188.
In Indian law cases, a CVSG is a common cert pool recommendation because of the
special experience-and the special relationship-that the federal government has with
Indians and Indian tribes. A CFR is also common because the Court does not require a party
opposing a cert petition to file a cert opposition brief. Both a CVSG and a CFR are
strategically useful to a clerk as a means of garnering more information about a complex
Indian law case. Holds and GVRs are often related to the likelihood that the Court will
decide another case that may decide the outcome of a later case. The clerk will recommend
a Hold if a cert petition should wait for the Court to decide a case already on the Court's
calendar. Once the Court decides that case, the clerk will then recommend a GVR, asking
the lower court to reconsider the same case given the new precedent. Summary reversals,
summary affirmances, and CFR records are very rare in the sample studied here.
30. See Stras, supra note 8, at 953; Tony Mauro, The Supreme Court Cert Pool:
Sotomayor Joins It, Lawyers Attack It, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES, Setp. 21, 2009,
available at http://legaltimes.typepad.comiblt/2009/09/sotomayor-joins-the-cert-pool.html.
31. See Stras, supra note 8, at 953.
32. SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
33. Id.
940 [VOL. 51:933
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(3) whether "a United States court of appeals .. .has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure
by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power;"
34
(4) whether "a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question
in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a
United States court of appeals; '35 (5) whether "a state court or a United States
court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court; ' 3 6 or (6) whether "a state court or a
United States court of appeals ... has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court." 37 Running throughout the
rule is the requirement that the question presented must be "important." Rule 10
also states that "[a] petition for writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law.
3 8
Primarily, the Court looks for cases in which lower courts are split or
lower court decisions conflict with the Court's own precedents.39 In the rare
circumstance where a lower court has made a decision that appears to be an
exceptional departure from normal "proceedings," the Court may be inclined to
exercise its supervisory power. The Court avoids petitions asking it to review a
lower court's findings of fact or application of a settled legal standard to specific
facts. In the parlance of the cert pool memo, cases in which there is no split in
authority are "splitless." Cases in which a party is asking the Court to review a
lower court's application of specific facts to a settled legal principle are
"factbound." It is clear from reading the cert pool memos contained in Justice
Blackmun's archives that the vast majority of Indian law-related cert petitions are
"factbound" or "splitless"-and often both.
Cert pool memos feature the Supreme Court clerks' recommendations on
whether to grant or deny a petition, or in other cases to seek the views of the
Solicitor General or hold a case, which means to not make a decision on the case
until another, similar case, is pending. These recommendations often are hedged
by a note that a case is a "close call." Not even the clerks can predict when the
Court will find a case "important" enough to justify granting the petition. The
Court might find some clear circuit splits too insignificant to resolve. In other
instances, the clerks note that a split is weak or illusory, which could mean that
there appears to be a split in authority, but one of the lower court cases forming the
split might have been resolved by alternative means. It could also mean that the
split is only dicta, or that the kind of dispute creating the split is unlikely to recur.
In short, most cases that are important enough are placed on the so-called "discuss
list."
34. Id.
35. SuP. CT. R. 10(b).
36. SuP. CT. R. 10(c).
37. Id.
38. SUP. CT. R. 10.
39. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT IS
265 (1987).
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Once the "discuss list" is compiled, the Justices confer, reviewing the
merits of granting cert to each case. Ultimately, if four Justices vote to consider a
case, cert is granted. If the requisite four votes are not obtained, cert is denied.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
A. The Court's Indian Law Docket (1959-Present)
The modem era of federal Indian law began in 1959 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Williams v. Lee, recognizing for the first time inherent tribal
sovereignty sufficient to defeat state interests.40 While Indian law cases have been
relatively few, few Supreme Court Terms since 1959 have not included at least one
or two, and a typical Supreme Court Term includes about three Indian law cases.
The Court has decided 130 federal Indian law cases since 1959.4 1 On the
merits, tribal interests (Indians, Indian tribes, and parties directly or indirectly
representing tribal interests) won sixty cases, lost sixty-six cases, and "tied" in four
cases that cannot be classified as a clear victory or loss.
1. Tribal Interests Success Rate: OT 1959-1985
From the 1959 through the 1985 terms, the Court issued eighty-two
Indian law opinions on the merits. Tribal interests won forty-nine cases and lost
thirty-three.
Table 3
Tribal Interests Success Rate before Supreme Court:
OT 1959-1985
Wins
Losses
40. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Charles Wilkinson is best known for identifying the
case as the first in the "modem era." CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME,
AND THE LAW 1 (1987).
41. See Turtle Talk Blog, Supreme Court, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/
resources/supreme-court-indian-law-cases/ (listing all the federal Indian law Supreme Court
cases and their outcomes since 1959). The United States Law Week classifications of
"Indians" or "Native Americans," supplemented by Westlaw's "Indians" headnote category,
were the basis for determining which cases were Indian law cases.
942 [VOL. 51:933
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2. Tribal Interests Success Rate: OT 1986-2006
During the 1986 through the 2006 Terms, the Court issued forty-eight
Indian law opinions on the merits. Tribal interests won eleven cases, lost thirty-
three cases, and "tied" in three cases.
Table 4
Tribal Interests Success Rate before Supreme Court:
OT 1986-2006
Wins
Losses
3. Tribal Interests Success Rate: OT 1986-1993
During the period of this study (the 1986 Term through the 1993 Term),
there were 163 paid certiorari petitions involving federal Indian law. The Court
granted certiorari in twenty-two of these cases42 and in another three unpaid
petitions.43 Of the twenty-two grants of paid petitions, the Court issued five GVRs
42. See Dep't of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512
U.S. 61 (1994) (No. 93-377); Okla. Tax Comim'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993)
(No. 92-259); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (No. 91-205 1); Lincoln v.
Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (No. 91-1833); Dep't of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., Inc., 502 U.S. 1053 (1992) (No. 91-907) (GVR); County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (Nos. 90-408
& 90-577); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (No. 89-1782);
Puckett v. Native Village of Tyonek, 499 U.S. 901 (1991) (No. 89-609) (GVR); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (No. 89-1322);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213) (Smith II); Wyoming v.
United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (No. 88-309) (affirmed by an equally divided Court);
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989) (No. 88-266); Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (Nos. 87-
1622, 87-1697 & 87-1711); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (No.
87-1327); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (No. 87-980);
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013);
Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 1), 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Nos. 86-946 & 86-947); Okla.
Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 484 U.S. 973 (1987) (No. 87-635) (GVR); Hodel v. Tribal Village
of Akutan, 480 U.S. 943 (1987) (Nos. 86-303 & 86-304) (GVR).
43. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (No. 92-6281); Negonsott v.
Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993) (No. 91-5397); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-
6546).
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(granting the petition, vacating the lower court decision without opinion, and
remanding back to the lower court). After the consolidation and remand of some
petitions (and with one affirmed by an equally divided Court), the Court issued
seventeen opinions on the merits, with tribal interests winning three and losing
fourteen-an 18% success rate.
Table 5
Tribal Interests Success Rate before Supreme Court on the Merits:
OT 1986-1993
Wins
Losses
4. Cert Petition Success Rate: OT 1986-1993
Also during the period of this study, states, state subdivisions, and state
officials filed thirty-seven certiorari petitions against tribal interests.44 The Court
granted certiorari in fourteen cases, with two cases GVR'd. The states won eight of
these cases on the merits, losing three. Indians and Indian tribes filed twenty-eight
petitions against state interests, with the Court granting certiorari in none of these
cases.45 The success rate of states in the certiorari process was 38% (fourteen out
44. The Court denied certiorari in City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe, 512 U.S. 1236 (1994) (No. 93-1753); New Mexico v. Navajo Nation, 507 U.S. 986
(1993) (No. 92-1238); County of Inyo v. Gutierrez, 506 U.S. 1028 (1992) (No. 92-686);
Wisconsin v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Chippewa Indians, 506 U.S. 829 (1992) (No. 91-
2037); Ponca City v. Hous. Auth. of the Kaw Tribe of Indians, 504 U.S. 997 (1992) (No.
91-1480); Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 997 (1992) (No. 91-569);
South Dakota v. Spotted Horse, 500 U.S. 928 (1991) (No. 90-1003); Connecticut v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 499 U.S. 975 (1991) (No. 90-871); South Dakota v. Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, 500 U.S. 915 (1991) (No. 90-749); Nevins v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 495 U.S.
1055 (1990) (No. 89-686); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 491 U.S. 906 (1989)
(No. 88-1752); Alaska v. Kanaitze Indian Tribe, 491 U.S. 905 (1989) (No. 88-1642); Iowa
v. United States, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989) (No. 88-1636); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Muscogee
(Creek) Nation, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988) (No. 87-1068); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
484 U.S. 1039 (1988) (No. 87-343); Jackson County v. Swayney, 484 U.S. 826 (1987 (No.
86-1978); McKenzie County Soc. Servs. Bd. v. V.G., 480 U.S. 930 (1987) (No. 86-996);
N.M. Taxation Dep't v. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 479 U.S. 140 (1986) (No. 86-367).
45. The Court denied certiorari in Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 512
U.S. 1228 (1994) (No. 93-1742); United Keetoowah Band v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 510 U.S.
994 (1993) (No. 93-616); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington, 507 U.S. 1051 (1993) (No.
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of thirty-seven petitions), while the success rate for tribal interests against states
was 0% (zero out of twenty-eight petitions). Private parties (non-Indian and non-
states) filed thirty-nine certiorari petitions and the Court granted four of the
petitions, a 10% grant rate. The Court granted certiorari in three out of five of the
petitions filed by the United States, consistent with the 70% success rate the
United States generally has as a petitioner.46 The only cert petition filed by an
Indian tribe granted by the Court was against an Indian couple trying to avoid the
application of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
47
92-1445); Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 507 U.S. 972 (1993) (No. 92-1088);
Elliott v. Vermont, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (No. 92-877); Sac & Fox Nation v. Okla. Tax
Comm'n, 506 U.S. 975 (1992) (No. 92-499); Wyandotte Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Okla. Tax Comm'n, 501 U.S. 1219 (1991) (No. 90-1756); Oyler v. Kansas, 502 U.S. 810
(1991) (No. 90-1704); Indian Child Welfare Act Coordinator of the Juvenile Court of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Chester County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 500 U.S. 918 (1991)
(No. 90-1493); King Island Native Cmty. v. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 500 U.S. 917 (1991)
(No. 90-1306); Cross v. Washington, 499 U.S. 922 (1991) (No. 90-1162); Osceola v. Fla.
Dep't of Revenue, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991) (No. 90-653); Oyler v. Jones, 498 U.S. 896 (1990)
(No. 90-223); Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska, 495 U.S. 919 (1990) (No. 89-1446); Hoopa Valley
Tribe v. Nevins, 494 U.S. 1055 (1990) (No. 89-890); Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New
York, 474 U.S. 823 (1985) (Nos. 88-1758 & 88-1915); Omaha Indian Tribe v. Jackson, 490
U.S. 1090 (1989) (No. 88-1426); Shoshone Tribe v. Wyoming, 492 U.S. 926 (1989) (No.
88-492); John v. City of Salamanca, 488 U.S. 850 (1988) (No. 88-84); Winnebago Tribe v.
Dep't of Revenue of Iowa, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988) (No. 87-1480); Makah Tribe v.
Washington, 485 U.S. 1034 (1988) (No. 87-1390); Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 516 U.S.
916 (1995) (No. 87-199); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 481
U.S. 1051 (1987) (No. 86-1574); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota (No. 86-1436);
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Ariz. State Transp. Bd., 480 U.S. 941 (1987) (No. 86-
814); Chunie v. Ringrose, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986) (No. 86-748); Native Village of Nanana v.
Alaska Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 479 U.S. 1008 (1986) (No. 86-662).
The Court arguably granted one cross-petition filed by a tribe against a state
subdivision, Yakima Indian Nation v. County of Yakima (No. 90-577), but never reached
the merits of the Nation's claim (that the County lacked the power to tax any Indian lands).
Cf Cert Pool Memo at 6, County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/199 1/
1991%20GRANTED-pdf/90-408.pdf ("The Yakima Nation's arguments on [cross-petition],
where they are the [Ninth Circuit] incorrectly decided that [25 U.S.C. § 349] continues to
permit state taxation of fee-patented [Indian] lands are largely in error. As the County points
out in its [response to the cross-petition], the Yakima Nation cites to cases that are
inapposite.").
46. Rebecca Mae Salokar, The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law, in SUSAN
Low BLOCH ET AL., INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES
835, 836 (2d ed. 2008) ("The solicitor general sought certiorari in 1,294 cases between 1959
and 1989, and was successful in obtaining the Court's review 69.78 percent of the time.").
47. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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Table 6
Cert Petition Success Rate: OT 1986-1993
70
60
+4 50
40
30
20 .....
101
Overall Tribe Tribal v. State States U.S.(1 of 92) (0 of 28) (14 of 37) (3 of 5)
B. The Court's Indian Cases During the Study Period (OT 1986-1993)
During the study period, the Court decided several cases that contributed
to fundamental changes to the foundational principles of federal Indian law over
the past two or three decades.
1. Religious Freedom
During this period, the Court considered and rejected Indian religious
freedom in two significant cases. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery4 8 and
Employment Division v. Smith /1,49 the Court denigrated the claims of Indian
religious freedom, favoring federal land agencies and state employment agencies.
In Lyng, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a federal road project
on federal lands that would destroy the sacred sites of Indian communities,
sufficient to annihilate the entire religion.5 ° In Smith, the Court rejected claims that
a state unemployment compensation system discriminating against Native
American Church worshippers was protected by the First Amendment, 51 and even
went so far as to fundamentally rewrite Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.52
2. The Indian Child Welfare Act
The Court also ruled on the Indian Child Welfare Act,53 a controversial
statute enacted by Congress to force the transfer of most state court cases
involving Indian children to the courts of Indian tribes.54 In Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,55 the Court held that states and private parties could
48. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
49. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
50. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51 ("virtually destroy"); Kristen A. Carpenter,
Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 324-28 (2008).
51. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890.
52. See generally FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 32-36 (2007).
53. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-03, 1911-23, 1931-34,1951-52, 1961-63 (2006).
54. See generally FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT at 30
(Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort & Wenona T. Singel eds., forthcoming Dec.
2009).
55. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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not undermine the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act by moving Indian
children out of Indian Country to avoid the Act's application.56
3. Federal Preemption, State Law, and Indian Law
During this period, the Court considered the interplay of federal
preemption, state law, and federal Indian law. In Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico,
the Court upheld a state law that taxed the business activities of non-tribal
members doing business in Indian Country,57 effectively precluding the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe from taxing businesses on their own reservation lands. Federal
Indian law preemption doctrine had "emphasize[d] the primacy of federal law in
the field of Indian policy."58 Prior to Cotton Petroleum, "[s]tate jurisdiction [wa]s
preempted by the operation of federal law if it interfere[d] with .. .federal and
tribal interests . . . . In the words of one clerk, the decision "substantially
alter[ed] Indian implied preemption analysis," 60 recognizing that state interests can
co-exist with federal interests.
4. Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Tribal Members
During the study period, the Court limited tribal jurisdiction over non-
tribal members in civil actions. In 198961 and again in 1993,62 the Court expanded
its holding in Montana v. United States.63 In Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation,64
and South Dakota v. Bourland,65 the Court made clear that the Montana rule-that
tribes presumptively do not have civil jurisdiction over non-tribal
members-applied not just to the very narrow fact pattern of Montana, but to all
cases involving tribes and non-members. The decision meant that a member could
not seek justice (through the tribal system) for a wrong committed against them on
tribal land if the wrongdoer was not a tribal member.
5. Tribal Treaty Rights
Two important Indian law cases came before the Court in forma
pauperis-Duro v. Reina66 and Hagen v. Utah.67 In Duro, the Court held that
Indian tribes do not have authority to prosecute Indians who are not members of
56. Id.
57. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
58. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 562 (5th ed. 2005).
59. Id. at 565.
60. Cert Pool Memo at 11, Rodney, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A. v. Revenue Div. of the Dep't of Taxation of N.M.,
490 U.S. 1043 (1989) (No. 88-773), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1988/DM 1988-pdff88-773.pdf.
61. See Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
62. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
63. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
64. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
65. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
66. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
67. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
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the prosecuting tribe for criminal offenses, 68 applying the implicit divestiture
doctrine, where the Court recognizes an implicit limitation in the sovereign
authority of Indian tribes in federal statutes and legislative history.69 In Hagen, the
Court held that the Uintah Indian Reservation had been implicitly diminished by
Congress. 70 Duro's importance declined after Congress overruled it by statute a
year after its announcement, 7' but Hagen's importance in the law of reservation
diminishment and treaty rights cannot be understated.72
6. Unanswered Questions
What the Court did not do is almost as significant as what it did. The
Court did not review a multitude of decisions in which a state government or
agency successfully opposed the exercise of Indian treaty rights,73 in which a state
or the federal government dispossessed Indian peoples of land and property, 74 and
68. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
69. For more on "implicit divestiture," see John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture
Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen's Handbook Cutting Room Floor, 38 CoNN. L.
REv. 731 (2006).
70. Hagen, 510 U.S at 412.
71. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004); Nell Jessup
Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 109
(1992); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It: A
Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 767 (1993).
72. See, e.g., Cert Pool Memo at 11, Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp.,
510 U.S. 1196 (1994) (No. 93-1223), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1993/Denied-pdf/93-1223.pdf (annotation) ("It's hard to say
whether the decision below is correct. Regardless, in view of Hagen, there seems to be little
reason to take this case.").
73. E.g., Elliott v. Vermont, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (No. 92-877) (state court
rejection of Abenaki treaty rights by adopting unprecedented common law standard);
Makah Tribe v. Washington, 485 U.S. 1034 (1988) (No. 87-1390) (federal court rejection of
attorney fees after Tribe won treaty rights issue against State); W. Shoshone Nat'l Council
v. Molini, 506 U.S. 822 (1992) (No. 91-1916) (federal court rejection of treaty rights after
application of wrong legal standard); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington, 507 U.S. 1051
(1993) (No. 92-1445) (federal court rejection of treaty rights based on alleged
misinterpretation of treaty); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994)
(No. 93-1742) (federal court rejection of tribal claim to tax immunities).
74. E.g., Nichols v. Rysavy, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (No. 87-73) (federal court
rejection of Indian land claims based on federal sovereign immunity); Pawnee v. United
States, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988) (No. 87-1312) (federal court rejection of claim that
Department of Interior set gas extraction rates too low, disadvantaging Indian tribes);
Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) (Nos. 88-1758) (federal
court rejection of Indian land claims); Littlewolf v. Lujan, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990) (No. 89-
538) (federal court rejection of constitutional challenge to White Earth Reservation Land
Settlement Act); Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. Rael, 498 U.S. 811 (1990) (No. 89-1716)
(federal court application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 to undermine Indian land claims against the
United States); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 503 U.S. 959 (1992) (No. 91-1124)
(federal court rejection of challenge to government approval of uranium mine operations);
Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. Thompson, 503 U.S. 984 (1992) (No. 91-1179) (federal court
rejection of claim that Pueblo Indian Land Board impermissibly extinguished Indian land
titles); Cherokee Nation v. United States, 504 U.S. 910 (1992) (No. 91-1354) (federal court
948
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in which lower courts limited the authority of Indian tribes without Congressional
authority to do so? 5 All of these cases had national import in Indian country and
some involved questions that remain unanswered to this day. For example, the
Vermont Supreme Court held in State v. Elliott that so-called "aboriginal" rights,
Indian rights to hunt and fish never abrogated by treaty or statute, have dissipated
by passage of time rather than by law.76 And the Tenth Circuit in Cherokee Nation
of Oklahoma v. United States adopted a crabbed reading of the Indian Claims
Commission Act's requirement that the government engage in "fair and equitable
dealings, 77 the meaning to which the Supreme Court has never clarified. The
Court also declined to hear a case decided by the Alaska Supreme Court that all
but gutted the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act in Alaska.
78
C. Scholarly Reaction to the Supreme Court's Recent Indian Law Decisions
Federal Indian law scholars have long theorized about the Supreme
Court's dramatic turn against tribal interests. Most harshly criticize the Supreme
Court's direction,79 while an influential few offer explanations and justifications
rejection of tribal damage claims against U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for damage to
Cherokee assets on the Arkansas River).
75. E.g., Totus v. Holly, 484 U.S. 823 (1987), reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 971 (No.
86-1912) (federal court vacature of tribal water protection code despite the code never
having been enforced); Navajo Tax Comm'n v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 498
U.S. 1012 (1990) (No. 90-635) (federal court rejection of efforts by tribe to regulate on-
reservation mining operations); Circle Native Cmty. v. Alaska Dep't of Health & Soc.
Servs., 508 U.S. 950 (1993) (No. 92-1536) (state court rejection of tribal court jurisdiction
over adjudication of Indian children); Anderson v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 508 U.S. 941
(1993) (No. 92-5988) (state court rejection of income tax immunity claim by Indian living
off-reservation but working on-reservation for tribal government); Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994) (No. 93-1724)
(federal court interpretation of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act's definition of electronic
games).
76. See State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 221 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
77. 937 F.2d 1539, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).
78. See In re Matter of F.P., 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992), cert. denied sub noma.,
Circle Native Cmty. v. Alaska Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 508 U.S. 950 (1993).
79. E.g., DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND:
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW (2001); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE
A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF
RACISM IN AMERICA (2005); Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for
Indian Tribes, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 113 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age
of Colonialism: A Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109
YALE L.J. 1 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381
(1993); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990); David H. Getches,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian
Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a
Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001); Joseph
William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit
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for the change,80 and still others recommend dramatic reform.81 Dean David
Getches performed an empirical study of the Court's decision-making process in
the context of federal Indian law. Based on the study's results, he argued that the
Court appears to be removing traces of the unique characteristics of federal Indian
law doctrines like the federal Indian law preemption doctrine 82-in other words,
moving the Indian law field into the "mainstream."8 3 Like Dean Getches, Professor
Philip Frickey argues that the Court is uncomfortable with what he calls the
"exceptionalism" of federal Indian law and is forcing the field's conformance with
the rest of constitutional public law. 4 The Supreme Court's recent Indian law
decisions offer strong circumstantial evidence that the Court has been reeling back
the tribal interest advances gained during the Warren and Burger Courts, such as
deference to tribal court jurisdiction 85 and preemption of state laws in Indian
Divestiture Doctrine to Implement its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36
TULSA L.J. 267 (2000); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal
Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEx. J.
C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural
Pluralism: Where Do Indigenous Peoples Fit within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
357 (2003); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions:
Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405 (2003); Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1995).
For critiques of particular cases or lines of cases, see Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting
Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73 (1999);
Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 357 (2009); Robert Laurence, Don't Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-
Year Contracts, Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, The Indian Civil Rights
Act, The Clean Water Act, and Justice Thomas's Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara,
40 TULSA L. REV. 137 (2004); John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment
of Ex parte Young, Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 787 (1999); LaVelle, supra note 69; Judith V. Royster,
Montana at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2006); Joseph William Singer, Nine-
Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2005).
80. See L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (2001). Cf Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the
Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996).
81. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic Dependent
Nations" in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated,
and Re-Empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443; Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 (2007); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian
Tribes Within "Our Federalism": Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667
(2006).
82. See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 58, at 561-65 (describing federal
Indian law preemption).
83. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of
States' Rights, Colorblind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L REV. 267, 280-81
(2001); see also Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier, supra note 79, at 1595-1617.
84. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public
Law, 119 HARv. L. REV. 431 (2005).
85. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845 (1985) (requiring non-Indians to exhaust tribal court remedies before challenging tribal
jurisdiction in federal court); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that state
950
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Country. 6 This study of the cert pool process adds new depth to the view that the
Supreme Court is actively limiting Indian sovereignty.
D. Federal Indian Law in the Supreme Court Cert Pool
As seen above, the bare statistics of the Supreme Court's certiorari
decisions in federal Indian law are disproportionately favorable to state interests.
The Court only granted four certiorari petitions filed by tribal interests: one that
involved an individual Indian respondent and three unpaid in forma pauperis
prisoner petitions brought by Indian convicts.
87
This Article theorizes that the Supreme Court's "agenda" involves
limiting the rights of tribal interests and that the certiorari process is a tool through
which the Court prejudices tribal interests.
E. Agenda-Setting and Federal Indian Law
A whole body of scholarly literature is devoted to exposing the Court's
political leanings in both its agenda-setting 88 and also its decision-making process.
There has been limited academic literature on Supreme Court agenda-setting in the
context of federal Indian law. 89 One study, covering the period of 1969 to 1985,
concluded that tribal interests won more cases than they lost.90 A second study
found that federal Indian law outcomes could be predicted by judicial ideology, the
Solicitor General's involvement, and whether questions of sovereignty were at
issue.91 A third study, covering the years 1969 to 1992, concluded that the
Rehnquist Court decisions were substantively different than those of the Burger
Court.92 The study argued that the Court employed a strategy of only granting cert
courts have no jurisdiction over civil suits against Indians that arise in Indian Country).
86. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987) (finding preemption of state gaming control laws in Indian Country); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (finding preemption of certain
state taxes in Indian Country).
87. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (No. 92-6281) (unpaid petition);
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993) (same); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)
(same); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1988) (individual non-
Indian respondent).
88. E.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1109 (1988); Kevin H.
Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REv.
727 (2001).
89. See John R. Hermann, American Indians in Court: The Burger and
Rehnquist Years, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 245 (2000) [hereinafter Hermann, American Indians in
Court]; John R. Hermann, American Indian Interests and Supreme Court Agenda Setting:
1969-1992 October Terms, 25 AM. POL. Q. 241 (1997) [hereinafter Hermann, American
Indian Interests]; John R. Hermann & Karen O'Connor, American Indians and the Burger
Court, 77 Soc. SCI. Q. 127 (1996).
90. See Hermann & O'Connor, supra note 89, at 136.
91. See Hermann, American Indian Interests, supra note 89, at 253-54.
92. See Hermann, American Indians in Court, supra note 89, at 254.
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to correct judicial errors to shape its Indian law agenda, without identifying a
cohesive agenda.93
What these studies did not (and could not) address is first, how the Court
effects major changes to substantive constitutional law by deciding which cases to
hear in the certiorari process, and second, the impact of the cert pool in the
certiorari process. This study attempts to focus on those questions. Like recent
studies of the Court's agenda-setting in general,94 this Article concludes that the
data in the cert pool is inconclusive as to a federal Indian law "agenda."
This Article highlights two areas of study. First, qualitative material in the
cert pool memos, mostly authored by the clerks for Justice Blackmun, reveal the
preferences of individual Justices. The overall value of that material is extremely
limited. Second, Justice Blackmun's docket sheets indicate the votes of individual
Justices during the certiorari process. These prove more interesting.
1. Agenda Preferences of Individual Justices
Justice Blackmun's clerks recognized that he was the leading scholar of
federal Indian law on the Court and perhaps the leading advocate for tribal
interests during the study period.95 To further his interests, the clerks occasionally
recommended a "defensive denial"-a strategy by which a Justice votes to deny
certiorari even though he or she wants the legal question answered.96 For example,
one clerk wrote about Cherokee Nation v. United States:97
I would not want to see the [Court] take this case. Because it is not
one the [Court] would handle well, it would likely declare the
93. See id.
94. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 24, at 409 (collecting studies).
95. See Cert Pool Memo at 14, Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe,
505 U.S. 1212 (1992), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1991/Denied-pdf/91-545.pdf ("You and [another clerk] are undoubtably
the Indian tax experts . .. , but [respondents] appear correct that there is a distinction
[between] trust lands and fee lands.") (annotation by Blackmun clerk); Cert Pool Memo at
11, South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 491 U.S. 906 (1989) (No. 88-1752), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1988/DM 1988-pdf/
88-1752.pdf ("You dissented in [South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S.
498 (1986)], believing that Congress did not intend for state statute of limitations to apply.
Even assuming that it does, I do not think you would disagree with [Fourth Circuit]'s
consideration of Indian interests in applying state law.") (annotation of Blackmun clerk);
Cert Pool Memo at 8, Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994)
(No. 93-1742), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1993/Denied-pdf/93-1742.pdf ("Questionable, particularly in light of your jurisprudence in
this area, but not necessarily certworthy.") (annotation of Blackmun clerk).
96. See PERRY, supra note 2, at 198-212, cited in LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 80 (2003); Robert Boucher & Jeffrey Segal, Supreme Court
Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Offensive Grants and Defensive Denials, 54 J. POL.
824 (1995).
97. 504 U.S. 910 (1992).
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provision to be unenforceable. (Imagine the [opinion] of Scalia, J.) I
think in the long run your friends are best served by denying cert. 98
Another example is the annotation in Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes:99 "I agree with poolwriter and the [Solicitor General] that this
[petition] should be denied. Moreover, a grant would only harm these Indians."' 00
Likely because Justice Blackmun's papers provided the data sample, there
is far less information about his colleagues on the bench. However, what is
available is worth discussing. Most notably, and perhaps confirming what Dean
David Getches and others have written about Justice O'Connor's personal interests
in western water law, deriving from her family's financial stake as ranchers in the
desert southwest,10' one Blackmun clerk annotated the cert pool memo in
California v. United States,10 2 a part of the decades-long dispute over the Colorado
River, to ask, "I wonder what [Justice O'Connor] will think about this?"'
10 3
Blackmun's clerks also recognized Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia as two major opponents to tribal interest claims. In addition to the example
above regarding the Cherokee Nation petition, a supplemental memorandum
drafted by a Blackmun clerk in the case Puckett v. Native Village of Tyonek'
04
demonstrated suspicion of the Chief Justice, asserting that Chief Justice Rehnquist
"may intend to use the GVR as a means of reflecting his disagreement with [the
Ninth Circuit]'s decision-an inappropriate use of the GVR mechanism.
' '105
98. Cert Pool Memo at 11, Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States,
504 U.S 910 (1992) (No. 91-1354), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/199 1/Denied-pdf/91-1354.pdf (annotation).
99. 507 U.S. 1003 (1993).
100. Cert Pool Memo at 8, Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes,
507 U.S. 1003 (1993) (Nos. 92-970 & 92-1286), available at
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1 992/Denied-pdf/92-970.pdf
(annotation).
101. See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 83, at 277-78; Andrew C.
Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v.
United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 744-45 (1997).
102. 490 U.S. 920 (1989) (per curiam).
103. Cert Pool Memo at 18, California v. United States,
490 U.S. 920 (1989) (No. 87-1165), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1 988/GM- 1988-pdf/87-1165.pdf (annotation).
Justice Blackmun's clerk also noted that Justice O'Connor appeared to be unusually
interested in cases that implicated the State of Arizona. See Cert Pool Memo at 1,
Connecticut v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 499 U.S. 975 (1991) (No. 90-871), available at
http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1990/Denied-pdf/90-871 .pdf
("I don't see why [Justice O'Connor] is so worked up over this case (the poolwriter who
suggested denial clerks for her) unless it's [because Arizona] urged a grant.") (annotation).
104. 499 U.S. 901 (1991).
105. Supplemental Memo, Puckett v. Native Village of Tyonek,
499 U.S. 901 (1991) (No. 89-609), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1990/DeniedMemos90-pdf/89-609.pdf (discussing Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)).
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Although this material clearly exposes procedural and ideological
disputes between chambers, it does little to explicitly explain the Court's agenda-
setting during the study period.
2. The "Discuss List'" and Certiorari Votes
The "discuss list" and certiorari votes expose how the Justices' ideologies
shape the Court's agenda, especially when the petitioner is a state, state agency, or
state subdivision. According to historical data, once a petition filed by a state is put
on the discuss list, it is much more likely than other petitions to be granted. This
indicates the Justices' deference toward state interests. Importantly, the votes
correspond to some extent with the generally recognized political tendencies of the
Justices. Without a doubt, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White voted for
certiorari in Indian law cases brought by state interests, far more than any of the
other Justices. Justice White's voting pattern can, perhaps, be traced to his
tendency to vote for certiorari far more than the other Justices in all cases, as has
been recognized elsewhere. 0 6 With some exceptions, the "conservative" or
"federalism" Justices-White, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Thomas, Kennedy, and
Scalia-voted to hear more Indian law cases than the "liberal" or "moderate"
Justices-Stevens, Souter, Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall. The key exceptions
were Justices Stevens, who voted in favor of granting certiorari more than his
liberal and moderate colleagues, and Scalia, who rarely voted to grant certiorari,
apparently demonstrating a strong distaste for federal common law cases.
A total of thirty-nine Indian law cases reached the discuss list during the
study period. Justice White voted to grant certiorari in 74% (twenty-four out of the
thirty-one) that arose during his tenure; Chief Justice Rehnquist in 64% (twenty-
five out of thirty-nine); Justice O'Connor in 55% (twenty-one out of thirty-eight);
Justice Stevens in 42% (sixteen out of thirty-eight); Justice Thomas in 42% (five
out of twelve); Justice Souter in 39% (seven out of eighteen); Justice Kennedy in
39% (thirteen out of thirty-four); Justice Brennan in 37% (seven out of nineteen);
and Justice Blackmun in 34% (thirteen out of thirty-eight). On the other end,
Justice Marshall voted to grant in only 15% of cases (four out of twenty-seven),
while Justice Scalia voted to grant in 29% (eleven out of thirty-eight). Justices
Powell and Ginsburg voted in fewer than five cases.
106. See Schoen & Walhbeck, supra note 7, at 11 (Hypothesis 6--"Justice Byron
R. White will be more apt to place cases on the discuss list than other associate justices.").
954 [VOL. 51:933
HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 954 2009
FACTBOUND AND SPLITLESS
Table 7
Votes for Certiorari from the Discuss List, by Justice:
OT 1986-1993
White
(24 of 31)
Rehnquist
(25 of 39)
O'Connor
(21 of 38)
Stevens
(16 of38)
Thomas
(5 of 12)
Souter
(7 of 18)
Kennedy(13 of 34)
Brennan
(7 of 19)
Blackmun
(13 of38)
Scalia
(11 of 38)
Marshall
(4 of 29)
Percent
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
I I I I I 1 I
I I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
I I IJ
I I
I I l -
I
States, state agencies, and state subdivisions filed twenty-one of the
thirty-nine cases on the discuss list. Out of twenty-nine overall petitions filed by a
state, 72% reached the discuss list. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White
again led the charge, with the Chief Justice voting to grant certiorari in 80%
(sixteen out of twenty) of cases and Justice White in 79% (fifteen out of nineteen
cases). Justice O'Connor was next with 62% of her votes in favor (thirteen out of
twenty-one). Justice Scalia was next with 50% (seven out of fourteen cases), a bit
of a departure from his overall negative rate. Justice Brennan voted to grant in
40% of the cases (four out of ten). Justice Stevens followed with 37% (seven out
of nineteen). Justice Kennedy voted to grant only five out of seventeen state
petitions (29%). Justice Blackmun voted to grant certiorari five times out of
nineteen cases (26%), Justice Souter in 22% of cases (two out of nine), and Justice
Marshall voted only twice out of fifteen petitions to grant certiorari (13%).
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Table 8
Votes for Certiorari from the Discuss List, State Petitions, by Justice:
OT 1986-1993
Percent
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
W hite J J I I I I I
(15 of 19)
Scalia l
(7 of 14)
Stevens
(7 of 19)
Blackmun(5 of 19)
Marshall
(2 of 15)
Only three paid tribal certiorari petitions reached the discuss list out of
twenty-eight (11%), while five unpaid petitions did. This percentage is far less
than the rule of thumb that only 70% of the petitions filed are "patently
uncertworthy."
1 07
There also appears to be a correlation between the conservative ideology
of some Justices in voting for certiorari once the cases reach the discuss list, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia betraying their hands by always voting
for state petitions and never voting for tribal petitions. Justice O'Connor's votes in
favor of certiorari are also consistent with her generally conservative voting
patterns, usually voting in favor of state petitions, as are Justice White's (although
his certiorari voting patterns are unusual).
F. Applying the Rule 10 Criteria to Indian Law Cert Petitions
1. Circuit Splits and Splits in Authority
As Rule 10 suggests, the best way to convince the Court to grant cert in a
particular case is to identify a circuit split or a conflict with Supreme Court
precedent.'0 8 In general, the study found few splits in authority regarding federal
Indian law, perhaps because the vast majority of the cert petitions in the sample
were from just three circuits-the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Cert petitions
labeled "splitless" are usually relegated to the dustbin.10 9 In some criminal law and
107. See Byron R. White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts
Description, 74 N.Y. B.J., Oct. 1982, at 346, 349, cited in Schoen & Walhbeck, supra note
7, at 2.
108. See PERRY, supra note 2, at 277; Cordray & Cordray, supra note 24, at 407
(collecting studies).
109. E.g., Cert Pool Memo at 11, Nichols v. Rysavy,
484 U.S. 848 (1987) (No. 87-73), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackrnunMemos/1987/Denied-pdf/87-73.pdf; Cert Pool Memo at 5, Ducheneaux
v. Sec'y of Interior, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988) (No. 87-1732), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1987/Denied-pdf/87-
J f
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Eleventh Amendment cases where a split did exist, however, the Court granted
cert. 10 Circuit splits tend not to arise in Indian law cases because often the only
possible split is between a state court and a federal circuit. For example, a cert pool
memo authored by a Kennedy clerk disposed of a petition arising out of Alaska by
noting, "Because of the local nature of this dispute, no conflict will arise in the
circuits.""'1 In South Dakota v. Spotted Horse,'1 2 Justice Blackmun's clerk wrote a
supplemental memo to the cert pool memo in which she noted, "As the poolwriter
noted, there will never be a split on the question of South Dakota's jurisdiction
over these tribal highways because both [Eighth Circuit] and the [South Dakota
Supreme Court] agree that the State is without jurisdiction."11 3 In Tarbell v. United
States,114 a criminal case involving the application of a federal statute that applied
to New York Indians, 15 the cert pool memowriter, an O'Connor clerk, noted, "Of
course, [New York] state is probably the only other jurisdiction that would have an
opportunity to rule on the issue."
'1 16
1732.pdf; Cert Pool Memo at 8, Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 512 U.S. 1228
(1994) (No. 93-1742), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1993/Denied-pdf/93-1742.pdf.
Non-tribal interests faced the same fate. E.g., Cert Pool Memo at 8, N.M. Taxation and
Revenue Dep't v. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 479 U.S. 941 (1986) (No. 86-367), available at
http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1986/MissedMemos-pdf/86-
367.pdf; Cert Pool Memo at 8, Am. Mgmt. and Amusement, Inc. v. Barona Group of
Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, 487 U.S. 1247 (1988) (No. 87-1790), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1988/DM 1988-pdf/
87-1790.pdf.
110. Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak (later Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak) involved a split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as did Duro v. Reina.
Negonsott v. Samuels involved a circuit split between the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. Hagen
v. Utah involved a split in authority between the Tenth Circuit and the Utah Supreme Court.
Rhodes v. Vigil (later Lincoln v. Vigil) involved a conflict between the Tenth Circuit's
lower court decision, a D.C. Circuit opinion (authored by then-Judge Scalia), and Supreme
Court precedent.
111. Cert Pool Memo at 5, Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska, 495 U.S. 919 (1990)
(No. 89-1446), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1989/DM- 1989-pdf/89-1446.pdf.
112. 500 U.S. 928 (1991) (No. 90-1003).
113. Supplemental Memo at 1, South Dakota v. Spotted Horse,
500 U.S. 928 (1991) (No. 90-1003), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1990/Denied-pdf/90-1004.pdf; see also Cert Pool Memo
at 4, South Dakota v. Spotted Horse, 500 U.S. 928 (1991) (No. 90-1003),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1990/Denied-
pdf/90-1004.pdf ("I note only that the fact that the [South Dakota Supreme Court] has
adopted the reasoning relied upon by [the Eighth Circuit] in Rosebud may counsel against
review since there is not now, and is unlikely ever to be, any split of authority on the
somewhat unique questions presented in these two cases.").
114. 500 U.S. 941 (1991) (No. 90-1386).
115. 25 U.S.C. § 232.
116. Cert Pool Memo at 12, Tarbell v. United States,
500 U.S. 941 (1991) (No. 90-1386), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1990/MissedMemos/90-1386.pdf.
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Moreover, the lack of circuit splits also can be attributed to the subjective
character of many federal Indian law doctrines, such as the federal Indian law
preemption doctrine'1 7 or the reservation diminishment cases,11 8 rendering
"factbound" what might otherwise be an apparent split in authority. Because these
doctrines are subjective, different outcomes between circuits may be attributable to
different facts. If cases are considered "factbound," Rule 10 weighs against
granting cert, even where a split in authority can be identified. As one Blackmun
clerk noted in the cert pool memo in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona
State Transportation Board:119 "A final factor which may be considered either as
supporting a grant or denying a grant is that the case involves pre-emption in the
context of Indian law. [C]ases involving pre-emption claims by Indian tribes may
merit a different analysis."' 20
One cert pool memo, involving a claim that federal Indian law preempted
a state's taxation of attorney fees, demonstrated the difficulty in establishing a
circuit split.'2 The memowriter, a Blackmun clerk, identified three Supreme Court
decisions that applied to the question, but the cases' disparate fact patterns created
different applications of the federal Indian law preemption rule---"I think
[appellant] has the better of the argument, though [appellant] overstates its case by
suggesting a direct conflict with this Court's prior decisions. Rather, I think the
question is open."'
122
Similarly, in Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona,123 a federal preemption
case, the cert pool memo concluded, "In sum, I agree.., that the lower courts are
not in full agreement in this area [preemption of state taxes in Indian Country]. But
the Court declined to grant in [earlier cases]. I see no reason to act differently
here.' 24 In one unusual case involving the application of the Indian Claims
117. See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 58, at 561-65 (describing federal
Indian law preemption).
118. See generally id. at 461-75 (describing numerous reservation diminishment
and disestablishment cases).
119. 480 U.S. 941 (1987) (No. 86-814).
120. Cert Pool Memo at 17, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Ariz. State Transp.
Bd., 480 U.S. 941 (1987) (No. 86-814), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1986/MissedMemos-pdf/86-814.pdf.
121. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. v. Revenue Div. of the Dep't of
Taxation of N.M., 490 U.S. 1043 (1989) (No. 88-773).
122. See Cert Pool Memo at 8, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. v.
Revenue Div. of the Dep't of Taxation of N.M., 490 U.S. 1043 (1989) (No. 88-773),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1988/DM1988-
pdf/88-773.pdf (discussing Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832(1982), and White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)); id. at 11
(noting possible application of Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
(1989)).
123. 481 U.S. 1042 (1987) (No. 86-1546).
124. Cert Pool Memo at 8, Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 1042
(1987) (No. 86-1546), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1 986/Denied-pdf/86-1546.pdf (discussing White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Ariz. State Transp. Bd., 480 U.S. 941 (1987) (No. 86-814), and N.M. Taxation &
Revenue Dep't v. Ramah Navajo School Bd., 479 U.S. 940 (1986) (No. 86-367)).
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Commission Act test requiring the federal courts to interpret the meaning of the
phrase "fair and honorable dealings," the exasperated poolwriter, a Souter clerk,
noted, "The decision below does not squarely conflict [with other lower cases],
which can be distinguished on its facts (though, indeed, where legal principles are
as squishy as those in this area, nothing squarely conflicts [with] anything
else)."'' 25
During the study period, the Court sometimes did not act on cases in
which the petitioner alleged a viable split or conflict with prior precedents if the
split was "weak" or "illusory." In Osceola v. Florida Department of Revenue,126 a
case involving the application of the Tax Injunction Act to individual Indians
seeking immunity from state taxes,' 27 the memowriter noted that the older case in
the split probably would have been decided differently if it were reconsidered in
accordance with later Supreme Court precedent.
1 29
Another cert pool memowriter described the apparent split in authority in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation,'29 a case where the
State "want[ed] to enforce petty traffic laws against Indians on reservations,"' 130 as
"not clean."' 3 ' There, what seemed to be a circuit split turned out to be illusory
125. Cert Pool Memo at 9-10, Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States,
504 U.S 910 (1992) (No. 91-1354), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1991/Denied-pdf/91-1354.pdf (citing Aleut Cmty. of St. Paul
Island v. United States, 480 F.2d 831 (Ct. Cl. 1973)).
126. 498 U.S. 1025 (1991) (No. 90-653).
127. See Osceola v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 893 F.2d 1231 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
128. Cert Pool Memo at 7, Osceola v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 498 U.S. 1025
(1991) (No. 90-653), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1990/Denied-pdf/90-654.pdf (citing Omaha v. Peters, 516 F.2d 133 (8th
Cir. 1975), Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1975), and Dillon
v. Montana, 634 F.2d 463, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1980)):
The [Eighth Circuit] apparently stands alone in holding that it will
support jurisdiction in a suit by individual Indians. This "split" does not
merit review, however. As [the Eleventh Circuit] noted,
Omaha v. Peters... came down before this Court's decision in Moe [v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, which precluded these kinds of
suits by individual Indians]. When [the Ninth Circuit]-which blazed
the ... trail with respect to individual Indians-revisited the issue after
Moe, it reversed itself, holding that Moe precluded the application of the
co-plaintiff doctrine .... My guess is that [the Eighth Circuit] will do the
same if it faces the issue in the future.
129. 503 U.S. 997 (1992) (No. 91-569) (Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., would grant
certiorari).
130. Cert Pool Memo at 1, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Reservation, 503 U.S. 997 (1992) (No. 91-569), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/l991/Denied-pdf/91-
569.pdf; see Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146, 147
(9th Cir. 1991).
131. Cert Pool Memo at 10, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Reservation, 503 U.S. 997 (1992) (No. 91-569), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1991/Denied-pdf/91-
569.pdf.
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because the character of the two state laws involved differed-one was explicitly
criminal, the other was a civil traffic statute. Explaining away the apparent split in
authority with a kind of logical leap, the memowriter concluded, "It remains
possible that either [court], if someday faced with the facts of the other's case,
would come out just as the other did. 1 32
The Court is also less likely to grant certiorari when a split of authority is
based in state law. Richardson v. Mt. Adams Furntiture,13 3 involved tribal
sovereign immunity in the context of off-reservation business activities.1 34 The cert
pool memo recommended seeking the Solicitor General's input after the
"[petitioner] identifie[d] an existing division of authority among state supreme
courts regarding the extent of tribal immunity from suit with respect to commercial
activities undertaken by tribal entities off the reservation."'135 The memowriter
explained:
[T]ribal immunity is a creature of federal law and can be adjusted
only by Congress. To the extent immunity reflects federal policies
regarding tribal autonomy and relations with outsiders, the
Government may have an interest in ensuring that the Court selects
an appropriate vehicle for addressing the immunity question.
136
The Solicitor General recommended denial of the cert petition. The next cert pool
memo in the case noted:
Neither of the [conflicting] state cases, however, is sufficiently
similar to the decision below to rise to the level of a split; both
involved state rather than federal law, and [one state case] rested on
132. Id. (citing St. Germaine v. Circuit Court for Vilas County, 938 F.2d 75 (7th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992) (No. 91-6385)); see also Cert Pool Memo
(2nd supplement) at 3, St. Germaine v. Circuit Court for Vilas County, 503 U.S. 997 (1992)
(No. 91-6385), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1991 /Denied-pdf/91-63 85.pdf ("Although the legal issue presented is important, these cases
are inappropriate vehicles for addressing it. As the [Solicitor General] points out, St.
Germaine and Colville Reservation do not conflict that squarely. And though the [Supreme
Court] may someday need to clarify Cabazon, it would do better to wait for cases involving
state laws that, unlike the ones at issue here, are neither obviously criminal nor obviously
civil.") (discussing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)).
133. 510 U.S. 1039 (1994) (No. 92-1398).
134. See In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom., Richardson v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 510 U.S. 1039 (1994) (No. 92-1398).
135. Cert Pool Memo at 1, Richardson v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 510 U.S. 1039
(1994) (No. 92-1398), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1993/Denied-pdf/92-1398.pdf. The split in authority involved Arizona
and New Mexico courts. Compare Morgan v. Colo. River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz.
1968) (finding tribal immunity); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654
(Ariz. 1971) (same); with Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989) (No. 88-415) (finding no immunity); Dixon v. Picopa Constr.
Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ariz. 1989) (same). Note the conflict in Arizona itself, not
discussed in the cert pool memo.
136. Cert Pool Memo at 11, Richardson v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 510 U.S. 1039
(1994) (No. 92-1398), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1993/Denied-pdf/92-1398.pdf
960
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the independent fact that the relevant activities were not 'tribal' for
purposes of sovereign immunity. In short, any split is not clearly
defined 37
It is often the case that a fact pattern will be unique to a particular tribe or
reservation, rendering the possibility of a split very unlikely. In cert petitions
brought by the Oneida Nations of New York and Wisconsin in the New York land
claims, 138 the cert pool memowriter wrote:
This is a case of some practical significance inasmuch as there is a
great deal of land in the balance, but the questions are not of general
legal significance meriting the plenary review of this Court.
There is no indication that these issues have arisen before or that
they will arise again.
There is no split of authority on the relevant powers or limitations
found in the Articles of Confederation or the Treaty of Fort
Stanwix. 1
39
Another cert petition involved the interpretation of an 1887 Nevada statute that, as
the cert pool memowriter noted, "[T]he interpretation of which can ... affect
[only] this case. 140 In one case involving the interpretation of a 1908 federal
statute, the cert pool memowriter noted:
All that would be left for us to do differently would be to reweigh
the application of that settled law to the facts surrounding passage of
the 1908 Act. Because the law is settled and the 1908 Act involved
only the land in the Addition, our decision would have little
significance beyond this case ([respondent] is correct that there is no
lower court conflict to resolve with regard to the issues in this
case). 141
137. Supplemental Memo at 2, Richardson v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 510 U.S.
1039 (1994) (No. 92-1398), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1993/Denied-pdf/92-1398.pdf (comparing In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590
(9th Cir. 1992); Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1029 (1989) (No. 88-415); Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ariz.
1989)).
138. Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) (No. 88-
1715); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) (No. 88-1915).
139. Cert Pool Memo at 13, Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 493 U.S.
871 (1989) (No. 88-1785), Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York,
493 U.S. 871 (1989) (No. 88-1915), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1989/DM- 1989-pdf/88-1915.pdf.
140. Cert Pool Memo at 8, Intertribal Council of Nev., Inc. v. Lujan, 493 U.S. 814
(1989) (No. 89-1947), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1989/DM-1989-pdf/88-1947.pdf.
141. Cert Pool Memo at 6, Navajo Tax Comm'n v. Pittsburgh & Midway
Coal Mining Co., 498 U.S. 1012 (1990) (No. 90-635), available at
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One certiorari denial, Circle Native Community v. Alaska Dept. of Health
and Social Services, demonstrates the enormous complexity of federal Indian law
questions. 42 It was an Alaskan case involving tribal authority to decide internal
child custody matters after federal statutes purported to divest Alaskan Native
villages of their tribal character. The case also posed the question of whether
Alaskan Native villages retained sovereign immunity. The cert pool memowriter
found that the splits in authority (there were two in this instance) were "square,"' 143
meaning that the case squarely presented the splits for resolution. The memowriter
concluded, "Although the issues are not very interesting and seem to have little
national significance, they are quite important to Native-State relations in Alaska,
and only this Court can resolve the conflict. I therefore unenthusiastically
recommend [a Call for Response with] a view to GRANT."' 44
But the state of Alaska threw a monkey wrench into the
proceedings-they questioned the legal status of the petitioner, often a confusing
question in Alaskan Native disputes.1 45 Cert was subsequently denied. 146 The
supplemental memo drafted by the clerk notes the clerk's confusion:
In short, there may be good answers to the problems [respondent]
raises, but I do not know what they are, and in any event the Court
need not address the [jurisdiction] question presented in a case that
would require preliminary resolution of other thorny and legally
insignificant issues.147
http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1990/Denied-pdf/90-634.pdf
(citing Act of May 19, 1908, § 25, 35 Stat. 444).
142. 508 U.S. 950 (1993) (No. 92-1536) (denying cert in In re F.P., 843 P.2d
1214 (Alaska 1992)).
143. Cert Pool Memo at 8, Circle Native Cmty. v. Alaska Dep't of
Health & Soc. Servs., 508 U.S. 950 (1993) (No. 92-1536), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/92-
1536.pdf (noting that Native Village of Venetie LR.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1991), conflicted with In re F.P., 843 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1992), and Native Village of
Stevens v. Alaska Mgmt. & Planning, 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1998)):
There is a split both on the narrow question whether Indian tribes in
[Alaska] have any [jurisdiction] over child custody matters, and on the
preliminary (though probably more important for Alaskans) question
whether Alaska Native villages have "inherent tribal sovereignty" [i.e.,
sovereign immunity]. Both splits seem to be square, and the Alaska
[Supreme Court]'s decision here demonstrates that it is unlikely to alter
its position any time soon.
144. Id. at 2.
145. Supplemental Memo at 2-3, Circle Native Cmty. v. Alaska Dep't of
Health & Soc. Servs., 508 U.S. 950 (1993) (No. 92-1536), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/
92-1536.pdf.
146. Circle Native Cmty. v. Alaska Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 508 U.S. 950
(1993).
147. Id. at 5-6.
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As a result, the clerk recommended denial. 148 After the petitioner replied to these
questions with copies of tribal council resolutions and a trial court order
recognizing the Community's right to intervene, Justice Blackmun's clerk noted,
"I recommend that the Court [call for the views of the Solicitor General]. The split
is real and conceded. The [Solicitor General] may help to sort out the preliminary
problems. ' 149 Regardless, only two Justices (Blackmun and Stevens) voted to seek
the views of the Solicitor General, while the rest voted to deny certiorari. 150
The emphasis on locating a split in authority affects federal Indian law,
perhaps, more than in most other areas of law. Consider Sokaogon Chippewa
Community v. Exxon Corp.151 The case involved a highly contested land claim of
immense importance to the tribal community and its neighbors, focusing on an
1854 treaty that was far from plain.152 The cert pool memowriter dismissed the cert
petition's claims with a curt blurb:
I think Judge Posner correctly interpreted the 1854 treaty as
extinguishing the occupancy [rights] under the 1842 treaty in
exchange for establishment of reservations and payments.
[Petitioner], having lost on its interpretation argument in both the
[district court and the Seventh Circuit], now seeks further appellate
review. Absent a split, I see no reason for the [Court] to look further
into this issue. 153
Of course, there likely would never be a split in authority on the 1854 treaty
because that case might be the only case ever turning on the treaty. Of all the cert
pool memos in the sample, only one memowriter-an O'Connor
clerk-recognized that "splits are rarer in Indian cases . . ,. . And yet, he
recommended denial of cert in Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County even
though he was not "sure that [the Ninth Circuit] got this right-it's a close
case-but there's no split, and the issue doesn't seem crucial enough to be
independently certworthy."1
55
148. Id. at 6 ("The conflict on the [jurisdiction] question is clear, but [petitioner]
asserts that there are at least 8 relevant cases pending in its region alone; the Court should
await a cleaner vehicle before stepping in.").
149. Id. at 6 (annotation of"AHS").
150. See Docket Sheet, Circle Native Cmty. v. Alaska Dep't of Health & Soc.
Servs., 508 U.S. 950 (1993) (No. 92-1536), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunDockets/1992/Paid/docket-92-1536.pdf.
151. 510 U.S. 1196 (1994) (No. 93-1223).
152. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 805 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Wis.
1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 219 (7th Cir. 1993).
153. Cert Pool Memo at 11, Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp.,
510 U.S. 1196 (1994) (No. 93-1223), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1993/Denied-pdf/93-1223.pdf.
154. Cert Pool Memo at 8, Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County,
512 U.S. 1228 (1994) (No. 93-1742), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1993/Denied-pdf/93-1742.pdf.
155. Id. at 1 (discussing Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355
(9th Cir. 1993)).
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2. Error Correction ("Factbound")
Many Indian law-related cert petitions are based in historical and treaty
claims that arise in facts limited to a particular tribe or region. Rule 10 notes that
"[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law." These claims are often labeled "factbound" and denied.
This issue is endemic to Indian treaty claims brought by tribal interests.
The number of cases where Indian tribes lost below and a Supreme Court clerk
noted that their petition was at least colorable, if not compelling, but where the
clerk recommended the denial of cert anyway, is surprisingly high. The standard in
these cases usually is described as: (1) Did the lower court correctly state (as
opposed to apply) the applicable rule?; (2) If yes, deny. As such, because few
courts commit the gross error of stating the wrong standard, the Court will hear
few Indian treaty petitions brought by tribal interests who lost below. Even in
instances where the lower court did state the wrong standard, as noted in the
Western Shoshone case in the introduction, 156 the Court may still deny cert.
The number of cases classified as "factbound" is the most significant
subgroup of the sample. One example is Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v.
Kemp. 157 The petitioner brought a race discrimination claim (amongst other
claims) because the United States foreclosed the mortgage of the only public
housing project for transient urban Indians. 158 On the cert petition, the pool
memowriter noted that the case was based entirely on the factual findings of the
district court and recommended denial. 159 Justice Blackmun's clerk agreed with the
recommendation but annotated the cert pool memo to state, "[s]ad case."' 160
Another example is Catawba Indian Tribe v. United States,'6 1 a case
involving a contract claim by the tribe against the federal government where the
cert pool memowriter wrote that "[t]his involves nothing more than error
correction."'162 Later, the memowriter noted, "This question is extremely
factbound, is not one of national importance, and involves application of settled
law."
163
156. See Cert Pool Memo at 9, W. Shoshone Nat'l Def Council v. Molini,
506 U.S. 822 (1992) (No. 91-1916), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/91-1916.pdf.
157. 494 U.S. 1078 (1990) (No. 89-1094).
158. See Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
878 F.2d 236, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1989).
159. See Cert Pool Memo at 4, Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. Kemp,
494 U.S. 1078 (1990) (No. 89-1094), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1989/DM- 1989-pdf/89-1094.pdf.
160. Id.
161. 509 U.S. 904 (1993) (No. 92-1617).
162. See Cert Pool Memo at 1, Catawba Indian Tribe v. United States,
509 U.S. 904 (1993) (No. 92-1617), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/92-1617.pdf.
163. Id. at 10.
HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 964 2009
FACTBOUND AND SPLITLESS
Similarly, a cert pool memo in Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington1 64
denigrated the Lummi Tribe's claims by noting:
[Petitioner] is unhappy with [the Ninth Circuit]'s determination of
the boundaries of the Lummi Reservation. Based on little more than
the testimony of a 100-year-old man in the early 1900s, [petitioner]
wants this Court to hold contrary to the plain language of the treaty,
the facts found by the [district court], and the presumption against
conveyance of land under navigable waters. The [petition] should be
denied.'65
Ultimately, the cert pool memo recommended denial on the basis of
unimportance. 166
Perhaps a more significant example of the fact-heavy character of Indian
law cases was Elliott v. Vermont,167 a case addressing whether the Abenaki people
retained their aboriginal rights after the State of Vermont was incorporated into the
Union in 1791.168 The state prosecuted Missisquoi Indians attempting to exert their
fishing rights on land they believed to be owned by the tribe in aboriginal title . 61
Under Rule 10, the Court is unlikely to grant cert in a case where the lower court
allegedly misapplied a properly stated rule of law. As the cert pool memowriter
noted:
At bottom, [petitioners] complain that the Vermont Supreme Court[]
misapplied the rule of extinguishment [of aboriginal title], not that
the Court misstated it. Indeed, the Vermont Court did an excellent
and extensive summary of the law of extinguishment, which appears
to be correct in all its particulars. Nonetheless, [petitioners] appear
to have a substantial argument that the admission of Vermont into
the Union, and Congress' concomitant de facto recognition of
Vermonter's land claims under the Wentworth grants, are not
sufficient to establish the clear intent required to extinguish
aboriginal title. Although the Vermont Court's opinion is both
exhaustive and scholarly, it does not take account of a fair bit of
evidence introduced by [petitioners] that suggest that even after
1791, the Abenakis continued to exercise aboriginal fishing rights.
164. 507 U.S. 1051 (1993) (No. 92-1445).
165. Cert Pool Memo at 1, Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington,
507 U.S. 1051 (1993) (No. 92-1445), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/92-1445.pdf.
166. Id. at 7 ("This case involves a very limited amount of land and affects a
limited number of Indians.").
167. 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (No. 92-877).
168. See State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 214 (Vt. 1992); Cert Pool Memo at 1,
Elliott v. Vermont, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (No. 92-877), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf/
92-877.pdf.
169. See Elliott, 616 A.2d at 211.
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The case is sui generis and probably does not warrant a grant of
certiorari absent a more meaty legal issue .... 70
This somewhat internally inconsistent cert pool memo (calling the
Vermont Supreme Court's opinion "excellent and extensive" while noting that the
court ignored the critical evidence raised by the Indians) places the claim in the
"factbound" category. The Court did not discuss this case in conference, according
to Justice Blackmun's docket sheet.
171
The lesson from Elliott appears to be that, so long as the lower court
states the proper test (a purely superficial exercise), the Supreme Court will not
review the lower court's application of the test except in "rare" circumstances.
Note that the cert pool memowriter must have had a short period of time to review
the history of the State of Vermont (probably a well-documented history) and the
history of the western Abenaki people; specifically, the Missisquoi people
(probably not as well documented). It is unlikely that a cert pool clerk confronted
with a case like Elliott could marshal the historical and legal knowledge in a short
period of time to conclude that the Vermont Supreme Court was wrong.
Indian law scholars, however, have concluded that the Vermont Supreme
Court in Elliott adopted a new test on aboriginal title extinguishment divorced
from the Court's precedents-the "increasing weight of history" test.' 72 The
petitioners' reply brief in support of its cert petition argued, in the words of Justice
Blackmun's clerk, "Vermont [Supreme Court]'s 'weight of history' approach
conflicts [with] this [Court]'s requirement that extinguishment be 'clear and
unambiguous."" 173 To be fair to the memowriter, he did note that "an argument can
be made that the Court has a special responsibility to ensure that Indian land
claims are resolved properly, with due regard for the traditional federal policy of
solicitude for Indian tribes."' 74 Even Justice Blackmun's clerk concluded that the
petition was factbound and not certworthy.1
75
Recent law graduates would have to have unusual knowledge about
Indian history to conclude that a court was so wrong on most questions based in
history and fact as to recommend that the Court grant cert. The chances of this
happening, especially with Rule 10's admonition that it is "rare," in an Indian law
170. Cert Pool Memo at 13, Elliott v. Vermont, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
(No. 92-877), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1992/Denied-pdf/92-877.pdf.
171. See Docket Sheet, Elliott v. Vermont, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (No. 92-877),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunDockets/1 992/
Paid/docket-92-877.pdf.
172. E.g., Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History
in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481 (1994) (quoting Elliott, 616 A.2d at
218).
173. Cert Pool Memo at 1, Elliott v. Vermont, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (No. 92-877),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-
pdf/92-877.pdf (annotation).
174. Id. at 13-14 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97
(1942)).
175. See id. at 14 ("The pool memo appears correct that the issue is factbound,
although [petitioners] have a good argument on the merits.") (annotation).
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context where a tribal interest is the petitioner, are all but zero. This structural
problem likely affects tribal claims, most of which are based in history, more than
any other constitutional subject area.
3. Importance
Rule 10 factors in the relative "importance" of a case in the certiorari
process. "Importance" is the greatest subjective factor that affects whether or not
the Court will grant cert in a particular case. The importance factor also provides
the Court great leeway to set a federal Indian law agenda, should it choose to do
so. The cert pool memos reflect clerks' predictions about what the Justices might
find sufficiently important to grant cert. Many memos, too numerous to discuss in
detail, evidence clerks hedging their bets by making recommendations to deny.
Many Indian law cases do not reach the discuss list because they are
labeled too unimportant to consider. Yet in several cases, such as Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association176 and Employment Division v.
Smith (I and 1I),177 the Court granted certiorari despite a clerk's recommendation of
a denial and noting the case to be factbound and splitless.'
78
As the following examples demonstrate, when a case is brought by a state
government, a local government, or the federal government against a tribal
interest, the cert pool memos either trumpet the importance of the case because of
the governmental interest involved or take it as a given that the case is important
because a state or the federal government filed the petition. Even if the
memowriter does neither and recommends denial, the Court might disregard the
recommendation, as was the case in Lyng, 179 Smith I,"0 and Smith I.1 81 It may be
176. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013).
177. 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Nos. 86-946 & 86-947); 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-
1213).
178. See Cert Pool Memo at 8-9, Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1987/Granted-pdf/86-1013.pdf (noting that the United States'
petition was a "fact-bound challenge" and that there was no circuit split); Cert Pool
Memo at 6, Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Nos. 86-946 & 86-947),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1987/Granted-
pdf/86-946.pdf ("Since [petitioner] also alleges no conflict in the lower courts over the issue
presented, on balance I do not think either [petition] is certworthy."); Cert Pool Memo at 12,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1989/GM- 1989-pdf/88-
1213.pdf ("[W]hile there is some dispute among the lower courts over whether religious use
of peyote by groups other than the Native American Church is protected, [petitioner]
identifies no lower court opinion that squarely conflicts with this one by holding that the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not protect members of the Native
American Church from prosecution for religious use of peyote.").
179. Cert Pool Memo at 8-9, Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc.
485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1987/Granted-pdf/86-1013.pdf (noting that the United States'
petition was a "fact-bound challenge" and that there was no circuit split).
180. Cert Pool Memo at 6, Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988)
(Nos. 86-946 & 86-947), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
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that the Court reviews some cases recommended for denial because the Justices are
concerned with leaving a lower court ruling in place that could apply to several
states.
1 82
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes,'83 a case involving the zoning authority
of Indian tribes on reservation land, was sufficiently important to be granted cert.
Amicus briefs filed by numerous states and counties noted that "the case is of
national importance: of the 930,000 people who reside within Indian reservations
nationwide, some 380,000 (41%) are non-Indians.', 184 The memowriter, a
Rehnquist clerk, argued:
To me, the [Montana] question appears certworthy, as it is not clear
from Montana just exactly how much civil regulatory authority a
tribe possesses over nonmembers within a reservation.
And, as amici point out, the question of tribal zoning is potentially a
very large issue, affecting many states and many private property
owners, who would be divested of some say in local zoning laws if
it were held that tribal zoning preempted state regulation."'
Justice Blackmun's clerk argued that the lower court decision favoring
the tribes was "basically correct-zoning jurisdiction over non-Indian parcels is
important to proper, consistent regulation of land uses. I would wait for further
development."' 86 But five Justices voted to grant certiorari,'8 7 perhaps on the basis
that the number of non-Indians affected by the case was so large. 188
BlackmunMemos/1987/Granted-pdf/86-946.pdf.
181. Cert Pool Memo at 12, Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1989/GM- 1989-pdf/88-1213.pdf
182. But cf Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and Indian Adjudication:
An Essay on the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REV.
543 (1985) (worrying that Supreme Court cases creating rules for tribes with small land
bases and populations will be applied to tribes such as the Navajo Nation, with a large land
base and a large Indian population).
183. 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (Nos. 87-1622, 87-1697 & 87-1711).
184. Cert Pool Memo at 18, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (Nos. 87-1622, 87-1697 & 87-1711), available at
http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1988/GM-i 988-pdf/87-
1622.pdf (referencing Brief of the States of Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming in Support of Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (Nos. 87-1622, 87-1697 & 87-
1711), 1987 WL 880161; and Brief of the National Association of Counties as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (Nos. 87-1622, 87-1697 & 87-
1711), 1987 WL 880371).
185. Id. at 19.
186. Id. at 20 (annotation).
187. See Docket Sheet, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (Nos. 87-1622, 87-1697 & 87-1711),
A -A
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Some cases are important because of practical problems that would arise
if a particular dispute is not resolved. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 89 the only Indian Child Welfare Act' 90 case granted certiorari by the
Supreme Court to date, was splitless.' 9' Nonetheless, the memowriter argued that
the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision "creates a jurisdictional 'black hole'
because Indian Health Service had a practice of transporting expectant mothers off
the reservation to give birth" in order to avoid the application of the Act., 92 The
Act required the adoption of all Indian children domiciled on the reservation to be
adjudicated in tribal court. The Court had granted cert in a similar case years
earlier, 93 but that case had been settled and dismissed.1 94 After Holyfield, the
Court has denied cert in every Indian Child Welfare Act-related case.'
95
A clerk might assign greater importance to a case if it involves a
significant number of citizens or a large amount of land. For example, the cert pool
memo in Navajo Tax Commission v. Pittsburgh & Midway Mining Co. noted:
[The case had] arguable significance .... The significance lies in
the fact that, as [petitioner] notes, the case involves jurisdiction over
a large area with an overwhelmingly Navajo population. (The
[petition] fails to state the population of the area, but asserts that the
number of Indians affected by the decision is 'far greater' than the
number affected by any of this Court's prior diminishment
decisions.). 19 6
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunDockets/1988/Paid/
docket-87-1622.pdf (noting that Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, and O'Connor voted
to grant cert).
188. Indian law scholars have observed a trend toward reviewing the
demographics of a portion of Indian Country in analyzing the contours of tribal government
authority. E.g., Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MNN. L. REV. 31,
69 n. 162 (1996); LaVelle, supra note 69, at 739.
189. 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (No. 87-980).
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1901-63.
191. See Cert Pool Memo at 5-6, Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30 (1989) (No. 87-980), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1988/GM- 1988-pdf/87-980.pdf.
192. Id. at 4.
193. See Pino v. Dist. Court, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985) (No. 84-248).
194. See Pino v. Dist. Court, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985) (No. 84-248).
195. Cf. Cert Pool Memo at 7, McKenzie County Soc. Servs. Bd. v. V.G., 480
U.S. 930 (1987) (No. 86-996), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1986/MissedMemos-pdf/86-996.pdf ("It seems wise to leave this
inherently family/tribal matter to tribal courts. In light of the fact that [petitioner] has now
arranged to pursue such matters in tribal courts in future cases, review of this case would
have little practical impact beyond this single case.") (annotation of Blackmun clerk).
196. Cert Pool Memo at 5, Navajo Tax Comm'n v. Pittsburgh & Midway
Coal Mining Co., 498 U.S. 1012 (1990) (No. 90-635), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackinunMemos/1990/Denied-pdf/
90-634.pdf.
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But the Court did not discuss this case at conference.1 97
Often, the initial cert pool memo recommends that the Court seek the
views of the Solicitor General to help in determining the importance of a case.
Sometimes, a petition headed for denial for lack of importance is resurrected by a
recommendation from the government to grant certiorari. Negonsott v. Samuels,19 8
one of the rare unpaid petitions in which the Court granted certiorari, is one such
case. The cert pool memowriter noted a clear circuit split between the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, 9 9 but argued against a grant because of the lack of importance of
the case. 20 0 After the cert pool memo recommended the Court call for a response
201from the State of Kansas, Kansas recommended that the Court grant certiorari.
The memowriter remained uncertain because of the limited impact of the older
Eighth Circuit decision and the complexities of Indian law.20 2 The Court then
sought the views of the Solicitor General, which urged the Court to grant cert,2 °3
which it did.2 4
197. See Docket Sheet, Navajo Tax Comm'n v. Pittsburgh & Midway
Coal Mining Co., 498 U.S. 1012 (1990) (No. 90-635), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunDockets/1990/Paid/
docket-90-635.pdf.
198. 507 U.S. 99 (1993) (No. 91-5397).
199. See Cert Pool Memo at 8, Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993)
(No. 91-5397), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1992/Granted-pdf/91-5397.pdf (discussing Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 F. Supp. 807 (N.D.
Iowa 1976), aff'd, 549 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), and Negonsott v. Samuels, 933
F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1991)).
200. Id. at 9-10 ("Accordingly, it is possible that [the previous case] today only
prevents prosecution of major crimes occurring on reservations in North Dakota and on two
reservations in Iowa.").
201. See Supplemental Memo at I, Negonsott v. Samuels,
507 U.S. 99 (1993) (No. 91-5397), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1 992/Granted-pdf/91-5397.pdf.
202. Id. at 1-2:
Ordinarily, with a clear split and both sides in agreement, I would
recommend a GRANT outright. But, I am given pause, because (as I
pointed out in the pool memo) [the Eighth Circuit] is pretty clearly
wrong-having skipped over critical legislative history in the committee
reports. Thus, the Court would simply be correcting a[n Eighth Circuit]
oversight. Moreover, it is difficult to tell just what the significance of the
split is. It is possible that the only prosecutions affected are on a single
reservation in Iowa and on a single reservation in North Dakota [Spirit
Lake]. Of course, the parties whose interests are most strongly [a]ffected,
the States of Iowa and North Dakota, have not been heard from. I still
feel very much in the dark about the general significance of this case. I
have a hunch the parties may be missing something-which is easy to do
in this complex network of old statutes.
203. See Second Supplemental Memo at 3, Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99
(1993) (No. 91-5397), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1992/Granted-pdf/91-5397.pdf.
204. See Docket Sheet, Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993) (No. 91-5397),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunDockets/I 992/1FP/
docket-91-5397.pdf.
970
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For whatever reason, Supreme Court clerks rarely find cert petitions filed
by tribal interests to be important.2 °5 For example, there are a good number of cert
petitions brought by tribal interests the clerks found to be compelling, novel, or
even interesting claims, but where the clerks also wrote that the underlying cases
were unimportant for a variety of reasons, usually related to the narrow factual
question. In short, claims brought by tribal interests are almost never important
unless there is a non-Indian law-related question of importance attached to the
petition. Often, the proxy for "importance" is whether a state government filed the
cert petition.
One illustrative case is Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak. °6 There, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit by Indian tribes
against states.2 0 7 The cert pool memo begins, "Because these are complicated and
far-reaching matters of federal jurisdiction, and because there is a split with the 8th
Circuit on the 1 1th Amendment issue, I recommend that the petition be
granted.20 8 Justice Blackmun's clerk argued valiantly against a grant in a
supplemental memo, noting:
I agree with [the cert pool memowriter] that the 11 th Amend[ment]
aspect of this case is certworthy. However, I think it would be
appropriate for the Court to wait to see the actual consequences of
[the Ninth Circuit]'s decision. [Petitioner's] contention that this
decision will open the floodgates to litigation by Native Americans
is empirically verifiable. Further, if [petitioner's] prediction is
accurate, the Court will have ample opportunity to revisit the issue.
The results of litigation from circuits other than [the Ninth Circuit]
and [the Eighth Circuit] would also be helpful. Finally, while I
believe the [Ninth Circuit] may have reached the correct result given
the unique status of Native American tribal governments in the
United States, the [Ninth Circuit] opinion in this case is less than
205. E.g., E-mail from Rebecca Womeldorf to Law Clerk, Hagen v. Utah,
510 U.S. 399 (1993) (No. 92-6281), http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1993/Granted-pdf/92-6281.pdf (noting that case is "not so sexy and is of
little general importance" but ultimately recommending a grant of the petition); Cert Pool
Memo at 8, United Keetowah Band v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 510 U.S. 994 (1993) (No. 93-
616), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1993/Denied-pdf/93-616.pdf ("The issue is not squarely presented in this case, and it is, like
the princip[al] question in this case, apparently of no general significance."). One
commenter on an earlier draft of this paper, a former Supreme Court clerk, likened Indian
law cases to habeas cases. According to the commenter, clerks carefully review a cert
petition where a state government loses in a lower court to a convicted criminal, or an
Indian tribe, but not the other way around.
206. 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (No. 89-1782).
207. Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak, 896 F.2d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir.
1990).
208. Cert Pool Memo at 1-2, Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak,
498 U.S. 807 (1990) (No. 89-1782) (referencing Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. Dorgan, 505
F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1974)), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1990/Granted-pdf/89-1782.pdf; see also id. at 10 ("[The l1th
Amendment issue] is an important issue of constitutional law, and there is a circuit split.").
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careful in its analysis. The Court might well wait for a better
reasoned opinion.20 9
The argument did not dissuade the Court or even Justice Blackmun, who offered to
serve as the fourth vote for certiorari if necessary.21
Another example is South Dakota v. Bourland,211 where the Court
narrowly granted cert despite a recommendation to deny. The cert pool
memowriter noted that the lower court decision favoring the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe might have been incorrect for failure to follow relevant Supreme
Court precedent. 212 But the memo recommended denial because there was no split,
nor could one be alleged.2t 3 And yet, despite the lack of a split and the
recommendation of the cert pool memo, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Stevens, and Thomas voted to grant certiorari.2 14 Is this a case of four
Justices voting reflexively in favor of a cert petition from a state?
Consider the Oklahoma Tax Commission, the entity involved in more
certiorari petitions in this sample than any other except the United States-five as
a petitioner and four as a respondent.215 The Court granted certiorari in four of the
five petitions filed by the Oklahoma Tax Commission, but in none of the petitions
brought by tribes against the Commission. Ultimately, the Commission lost two of
the three cases it litigated to a final result in the Supreme Court-Sac and Fox and
Citizen Band Potawatomi-while winning in Graham, a relatively insignificant
209. Supplemental Memo, Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775 (1991) (No. 89-1782), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1990/Granted-pdf/89-1782.pdf.
210. See Docket Sheet, Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775 (1991) (No. 89-1782), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunDockets/1990/Paid/docket-89-1782.pdf.
211. 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (No. 91-2051).
212. See Cert Pool Memo at 8, 9-10, South Dakota v. Bourland,
508 U.S. 679 (1993) (No. 91-2051), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1 992/Granted-pdf/91-2051 .pdf (discussing Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), and
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
213. Id. at 10 ("Assuming arguendo that such lands are rare, and thus that a
circuit split is unlikely to arise, the issue is not sufficiently important for this Court.").
214. See Docket Sheet, South Dakota v. Bourland,
508 U.S. 679 (1993) (No. 91-2051), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunDockets/1992/Paid/docket-91-2051 
.pdf.
215. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 484 U.S. 973 (1987) (No. 87-635)
(GVR); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988) (No. 87-
1068) (cert. denied); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989) (No. 88-266)
(decided with opinion); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (No. 89-1322) (decided with opinion); City Vending of
Muscogee, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. 823 (1990) (No. 89-2011) (certiorari
denied); Wyandotte Tribe of Okla. v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 501
U.S. 1219 (1991) (No. 90-1756) (cert. denied); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation,
508 U.S. 114 (1993) (No. 92-259) (decided with opinion); Sac and Fox Nation v. Okla. Tax
Comm'n, 506 U.S. 975 (1992) (No. 92-499) (cert. denied); United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 510 U.S. 994 (1993) (No. 93-616) (cert. denied).
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case with only tangential Indian law issues.216 But in the cert pool memos, the
clerks described the interests of the Oklahoma Tax Commission as raising
"important concerns of federalism, '217 while similar tribal petitions were "of no
general significance.
'
,
218
Other petitions brought by state governments or agencies implicated the
power of states to enforce criminal laws against peyote,219 the power of states to
enforce its taxes on non-Indians in Indian Country,220 and the water rights of states
and their constituents.221 The Court granted certiorari in all these cases.
216. But see Kaighn Smith, Jr., Federal Courts, State Power, and Indian Tribes:
Confronting the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 35 N.M. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (2005) (noting
that the question in Graham involving the well-pleaded complaint rule is a significant one
for tribal interests).
217. Cert Pool Memo at 15, Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (No. 89-1322), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1990/Granted-pdf/
89-1322.pdf (annotation of Blackmun clerk).
218. Cert Pool Memo at 8, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians
v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 510 U.S. 994 (1993) (No. 93-616), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1 993/Denied-pdf/
93-616.pdf.
219. See Cert Pool Memo at 5, Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988)
(Nos. 86-946 & 86-947), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
BlackmunMemos/1987/Granted-pdf/86-946.pdf ("1 think it a close question whether this
case is certworthy. There is some force to [petitioner]'s argument that Sherbert and Thomas
are distinguishable because use of peyote-unlike refusal to work on Saturday or refusal to
work in a munitions factory-is a crime in Oregon.") (citing Sherbert v. Werner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981)); Cert Pool Memo at 10,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/researchlBlackmunMemos/ 989/GM- 1989-pdf/
88-1213.pdf ("On remand, the Oregon Sup Ct concluded that such conduct was not
exempted from the reach of Oregon's statute barring possession of controlled substances,
but that 'outright prohibition of good faith religious use of peyote by adult members of the
Native American Church would violate the First Amendment."' (quoting Smith v.
Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988))).
220. See Cert Pool Memo at 1, Dep't of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., Inc., 502 U.S. 1053 (1992) (No. 91-907), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1993/Granted-pdf/
91-907.pdf (describing the petitioner as a "financially strapped State [that] wants to tax
cigarettes sold to non-Indians on Indian reservations"); Cert Pool Memo at 3, Dep't of
Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (No. 93-377),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1993/Granted-
pdf/93-377.pdf ("The issue, however, is important both legally and practically, and the NY
Ct App does not seem willing to heed anything but a reversal on the merits.").
221. See Cert Pool Memo at 24, Wyoming v. United States,
492 U.S. 406 (1989) (No. 88-309), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1988/GM-1988-pdf/88-309.pdf ("This is an important case. It
has apparently received national attention since it began in 1977, and the outcome, in a
region where agriculture and industry need an assured water supply, will affect thousands of
people.").
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Conversely, claims brought by tribal petitions often are labeled
unimportant without much discussion. One exemplary case is Pueblo of Santo
Domingo v. Thompson.222 The United States and the Pueblo had brought claims
that the Pueblo Lands Board had invalidly extinguished Pueblo title to certain
lands in New Mexico. 23 The cert pool memowriter noted, "It seems clear that the
Board erred 60 years ago when it extinguished Pueblo title in this overlap land;
section 14 of the 1924 Act prohibited such a result.' ' 224 But the poolwriter
recommended denial because the outcome of the case would affect only a few
tribes. 225 Even Justice Blackmun's clerk wrote in the margin, "While I think [the
Tenth Circuit] may have erred, I see no issue of general importance. 226
Another case of major importance to Indian Country, but one the Court
did not discuss in conference, is Western Shoshone National Council v. Molini.227
In that case, the Ninth Circuit had held that the Indian Claims Commission award
in United States v. Dann228 acted as a bar to the Western Shoshone claims that the
State of Nevada had interfered with their aboriginal and treaty rights. 229 The cert
pool memowriter noted that the claim was viable but unimportant.23 ° Justice
Blackmun's clerk disagreed, annotating the cert pool memo by arguing that the
case "may merit summary reversal on application of the wrong standard., 2 3' In
short, though the lower court may have gotten the case wrong by applying the
incorrect standard, effectively eradicating the hunting and fishing rights of an
entire tribe, the Court would not find the case to be important enough to discuss.232
Similarly, the cert pool memowriter in Makah Tribe v. Washington2 33
noted that the lower court's decision may have been "a clearly unwarranted
departure from precedent," but recommended denial of the petition because
222. 503 U.S. 984 (1992) (Nos. 91-1179 & 91-1346).
223. See United States v. Thompson, 708 F. Supp. 1206, 1208-10 (D. N.M. 1989).
224. Cert Pool Memo at 12-13, Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. Thompson,
503 U.S. 984 (1992) (Nos. 91-1179 & 91-1346), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1991/Denied-pdf/
91-1 179.pdf (citing Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 636).
225. See id. at 13 (citing United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926)).
226. Id. at 14.
227. 506 U.S. 822 (1992) (No. 91-1916).
228. 873 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989).
229. W. Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 202-03 (9th Cir. 1991).
230. See Cert Pool Memo at 7, 9, W. Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini,
506 U.S. 822 (1992) (No. 91-1916), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Denied-pdf!91-1916.pdf ("At bottom, any tension in the
case law over the viability of claims involving hunting and fishing rights appears highly
fact-based and falls short of a genuine legal conflict .... Although this case affects a sizable
class, and involves national interests, the issues presented are largely factbound and seem
unlikely to have broad implications for other litigants." (discussing Or. Dep't of Fish &
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985))).
231. Id. at 9.
232. See Docket Sheet, W. Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 506 U.S. 822
(1992) (No. 91-1916), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/
BlackmunDockets/1992/Paid/docket-91-1916.pdf.
233. 485 U.S. 1034 (1988) (No. 87-1390).
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"review would be merely for error correction. ' 23 The Ninth Circuit held that
prevailing tribes in the United States v. Washington litigation could not recover
attorney fees under federal civil rights statutes.235 Justice Blackmun's clerk's
annotation, while sympathetic to the tribal petitioner, still doubted the importance
of the question:
This is a hard call. It seems to me that [petitioners] are right in every
respect: [the Ninth Circuit]'s decision is wrong as a matter of law
and has no obvious limiting principle. On the other hand, my
instinct is that the memowriter may be correct in viewing this case
as an isolated blunder. Since I'm also sympathetic to [petitioners] on
the merits, [I'd] be inclined to keep their claim alive. I'm really not
sure what the [Solicitor General] would have to say. I appeal to your
judgment.236
As with determinations that a case is "factbound," clerks often conclude
that the limited geographic import of a particular claim renders the case less
important-unless a state government brought the claim.
4. Gross Error
More rarely, the cert pool memos will assert that a lower court decision is
clearly wrong, or in the Rule's language, "has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . . ,237 As the language suggests, this
happens less often than circuit splits. The complexity and ambiguity of federal
Indian law, however, creates circumstances where lower courts do seem to deviate
from Supreme Court precedents, perhaps more often than in other contexts. The
classic example is Department of Taxation and Finance of New York v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., Inc.238 That case reached the Supreme Court twice: the first time,
the Court GVR'd the case in light of Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma;239 the second time, the Court reversed the
New York Court of Appeals on the merits. 240 The Court's opinion in Milhelm
Attea noted that the outcome turned on "the narrow[] question of whether the New
York scheme is inconsistent with the Indian Trader Statutes., 241 The cert pool
memos indicated another reason for the Court to decide the case. The memowriter
indicated that a line of New York Court of Appeals' decisions were not aligned
234. Cert Pool Memo at 7, Makah Tribe v. Washington,
485 U.S. 1034 (1988) (No. 87-1390), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1987/Denied-pdf/87-1390.pdf.
235. See United States v. Washington, 813 F.2d 1020, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 1987).
236. Supplemental Memo, Makah Tribe v. Washington,
485 U.S. 1034 (1988) (No. 87-1390), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1987/Denied-pdf/87-1390.pdf.
237. SuP. CT. R. 10(a).
238. 502 U.S. 1053 (1992) (No. 91-907), after remand, 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (No.
93-377).
239. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
240. See Milhem Attea, 512 U.S. at 78 (reversing Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v.
Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y., 615 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1993)).
241. Id. at 70.
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with Supreme Court precedent. 242 Even prior to the Milhelm Attea remand, the
Court had GVR'd an earlier New York Court of Appeals decision on similar
grounds.243 The poolwriter noted:
[T]he [New York Court of Appeals] has not 'moved' on this issue
since the [Supreme Court] vacated and remanded Herzog in 1988,
the decision below is at least suspect, and if [New York]'s
regulatory approach is the only effective way [petitioner]s can
police the retail sale of taxable cigarettes on Indian reservations, the
[courts] below have put [petitioners] in a tough spot.244
After another decision from the New York Court of Appeals reaching the
same outcome (Herzog apparently was not appealed to the Supreme Court after
remand), the cert pool memowriter wrote, "The [New York Court of Appeals]
stubbornly refuses to alter its questionable preemption analysis, despite two
GVR's from this [Court] (one in this case, and one in Herzog) .... Moreover,
according to the memo, "the issue, however, is important both legally and
practically, and the [New York Court of Appeals] does not seem willing to heed
anything but a reversal on the merits. ' 24 6 Justice Blackmun's clerk objected,
annotating the cert pool memo in the first Milhem Attea petition with this grumble:
"Is this such an important case? What 20 [pages] of memos comes down to is this:
the [New York Court of Appeals] misread one of this [Court]'s cases. What
happened to the word 'split' [?] 247
One of the key sticking points in federal Indian law is the doctrine
surrounding the "special relationship" between the United States and Indian
tribes.248 The most interesting example of this situation is the Arkansas River case,
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States.249 The Cherokee Nation brought a
242. Cert Pool Memo at 10-11, Dep't of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., Inc., 502 U.S. 1053 (1992) (No. 91-907), available at
http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1991/Denied-pdf/91-907.pdf
(quoting Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 508 N.E.2d 914, 920 (N.Y.
1987), vacated and remanded, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988)).
243. See Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 508 N.E.2d 914
(N.Y. 1987), vacated and remanded, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988).
244. Cert Pool Memo at 13-14, Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., Inc., 502 U.S. 1053 (1992) (No. 91-907), available at
http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/199 1/Denied-pdf/91-
907.pdf.
245. Cert Pool Memo at 2, Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (No. 93-377), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/I 993/Granted-pdf/
93-377.pdf.
246. Id. at 3.
247. Cert Pool Memo (supplement) at 6, Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y.
v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 502 U.S. 1053 (1992) (No. 91-907), available
at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/199 1/Denied-pdf/
91-907.pdf.
248. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: 2005 ED.
§ 5.01[l]-[4] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.).
249. 504 U.S. 910 (1992) (No. 91-1354).
Am --
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claim against the United States for damages related to the construction of the
Arkansas River Navigation System, which implicated the Nation's treaty rights.
250
The cert pool memowriter recommended the denial of the Cherokee Nation's
petition, noting "the strangeness of the entire inquiry. '25 The poolwriter could not
find that a split existed or whether the lower court was clearly wrong because
"given the inquiry, how could [the court] be [wrong]? '252
In other cases, the clerks focus on non-Indian law-related questions. One
example is Rhodes v. Vigil.253 The Indian Health Service had lost at the lower court
level on the question of its discretion to eliminate a program for handicapped
Indian children.2 5 4 The cert pool memowriter noted, "There is no clear split in
authority, but the decisions below is certainly in tension with the Court's
decision[s], and the D.C. Circuit's approach .. 255 But the cert pool memowriter
acknowledged that the split was not clean.2 5 6 The memowriter recommended
granting cert on the basis of "the egregiousness of the [Tenth Circuit]'s
errors . ,257 Justice Blackmun's clerk wrote a supplemental memo arguing
against granting certiorari on the basis that the Indian law character of the claim
made the split illusory28 The argument won over Justice Blackmun, but the Court
still granted certiorari.259
250. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States. 937 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1991).
251. See Cert Pool Memo at 8-9, Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 504
U.S 910 (1992) (No. 91-1354), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1991/Denied-pdf/91-1354.pdf (citing 25 U.S.C. § 70a and
United States v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 576 F.2d 870, 883 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Nichols,
J.)) ("Given the strangeness of the entire inquiry, one cannot easily evaluate either the
merits or the certworthiness of [petitioner's] claim.").
252. Id. at 9; see also id. at 10 ("[W]here legal principles are as squishy as those
in this area, nothing squarely conflicts w/ anything else.").
253. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (No. 91-1833).
254. See Vigil v. Rhodes, 953 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1992).
255. Cert Pool Memo at 16, Rhodes v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (No. 91-1833),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1992/Granted-
pdf/91-1833.pdf (citing Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991), and Int'l Union,
United Autoworkers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
256. See id. at 17 ("Neither the 'special relationship' nor the requirement that the
money be spent on Indian health provide any meaningful standards against which to
measure a decision to fund one Indian health project rather than another.") (citing Int'l
Union, 746 F.2d at 855).
257. Id. at 18.
258. See Supplemental Memo, Rhodes v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993)
(No. 91-1833), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/
1992/Granted-pdf/91 -1833.pdf.
259. See Rhodes v. Vigil, 506 U.S. 813 (1992); Docket Sheet, Rhodes v. Vigil,
508 U.S. 182 (1993) (No. 91-1833), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/BlackmunDockets/1992/Paid/docket-9 1-1833.pdf.
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G. The Structure and Mechanics of the Certiorari Process Discriminates
Against Tribal Interests
1. The Mechanics of the Certiorari Process
There is a great deal of circumstantial evidence that the factors articulated
in Rule 10 create a structural barrier to the fair disposition of cases brought by
tribal interests. In short, the subjective and objective factors the Supreme Court's
clerks look for in the certiorari process encourage the dismissal of tribal
arguments.
Professor David Stras has broken down the import of the clerks in the
Supreme Court's cert pool, first noting that the creation of the cert pool has "led to
a homogenization of the [certiorari] process .... " largely because the clerk in the
cert pool now writes for "anywhere from five to eight Justices., 260 Also, Stras
points out, political science scholar H.W. Perry's interviews with former clerks
"suggest that, because recommendations to deny a case are the norm, law clerks
pay far less attention to those recommendations than to recommendations to grant
during the annotation process, increasing the likelihood that an issue of importance
will be overlooked., 26' The creation of the cert pool may have created, in former
D.C. Circuit judge and Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr's words, a "hydraulic
pressure to say no., 262 Stras argues that three factors push cert pool clerks to
recommend a denial in tough cases: (1) it is less risky because a recommendation
to deny will receive less scrutiny from clerks in other chambers; (2) it avoids cases
in which the Court might be forced to dismiss a grant of certiorari as improvidently
granted (apparently a result that clerks "dread"); and (3) general signals from the
Court that the fewer cases the better.263
Finally, the inexperience of the clerks hurts tribal petitions: "Incoming
law clerks, often fresh off of a clerkship with a judge on the United States Courts
of Appeals, have little training and even less experience screening petitions for
certiorari.' '2 64 As noted in Part III, there are several cert pool memos that evidence
a clerk's lack of understanding of multiple aspects of federal Indian law. For
example, some clerks seem surprised that Indian tribes have immunity from suit.
265
260. Stras, supra note 8, at 973. Justice Alito's announcement that he will drop
out of the cert pool in the 2008 Term is an interesting development. See Adam Liptak, A
Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The 'Cert. Pool', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2008, at A21. Justice Sotomayor may follow his lead . . . or not. See Tony Mauro, The
Supreme Court Cert Pool: Sotomayor Joins It, Lawyers Attack It, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF
LEGALTIMES, Setp. 21, 2009, available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/09/
sotomayor-joins-the-cert-pool.html.
261. Stras, supra note 8, at 974 (citing PERRY, supra note 2, at 63).
262. Id. at 975 (quoting Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking
Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1363, 1377 (2006)).
263. See id. at 975 (citations omitted).
264. Id.
265. E.g., Cert Pool Memo at 3, Aetna Casualty Co. v. Smith Plumbing Co., 479
U.S. 987 (1986) (No. 86-588); Supplemental Memo at 3, Aetna Casualty Co. v. Smith
Plumbing Co., 479 U.S. 987 (1986) (No. 86-588).
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Other clerks complain about the vagueness of federal common law tests. 266 In
many circumstances, the data indicates that a Supreme Court clerk will always
recommend the denial of a petition filed by a tribal interest for the reasons
Professor Stras suggests.
The cert pool Justices in the study period, except Justice Blackmun,
constituted the core of the Court that would bring federalism jurisprudence to the
forefront of American constitutional law in the 1990s267-mainly Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Cert pool
clerks knew that they were writing for an audience that consisted of Justices often
interested in states' rights. There must be different tugs on a memowriter. The
audience cannot be ignored, but the memowriter wants to be fair and candid about
the petitions. Early in a law clerk's one-year stint, before a memowriter becomes
confident and experienced in this unusual job, he or she is perhaps more likely to
write to this audience of "federalism" Justices that constitute the core of this
audience.268 And so the cert pool memos, whether the clerks intend to or not, are
less likely to trumpet the merits of a legal position put forward by a tribal interest
than a state interest. A cert pool memo candidly noting that a state's position is
weak in comparison to a tribe's position likely will not win points with the
conservative Justices in the cert pool, while a memo understating the possible
strength of a tribal position might undermine the cert pool memowriter's
reputation. This suggests the possible creation of a cert pool culture, as suggested
by David Stras, himself a former clerk.269 However, the import of the cert pool can
be overstated. It bears mention that the Court several times rejected the
recommendation of the poolwriters.
In the cases decided since the end of this study, from 1994 to the present,
the ratio of wins and losses remains the same.2 70 Now, seven of the nine Justices
participate in the cert pool, including three Democratic appointees. The "audience"
for the cert pool clerks includes four "federalism" Justices (Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy), and three others (Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor). One
would expect the cert pool memos in the last fifteen years or so to reflect the
presence of the non-federalism Justices, but one could also expect that the focus of
the cert pool memos would not reflect the minority. The cert pool memos appear to
function as a means to crystallize the thinking of the Court on a particular case
266. See Cert Pool Memo at 8-9, Cherokee Nation of Okla.v. United States,
504 U.S 910 (1992) (No. 91-1354), available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/
research/BlackmunMemos/1991/Denied-pdf/91-1354.pdf ("Given the strangeness of the
entire inquiry, one cannot easily evaluate either the merits or the certworthiness of
[petitioner's] claim.").
267. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT
AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 249-78 (2005); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2001).
268. Thanks to Phil Frickey and David Stras for making this point.
269. See Stras, supra note 8, at 974-75.
270. Tribal interests have "won" eight out of thirty Supreme Court cases since the
end of the study period, excluding "ties." See Turtle Talk Blog, Supreme Court,
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/supreme-court-indian-law-cases/ (listing all the federal
Indian law Supreme Court cases and their outcomes since 1959).
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before any individual Justice reviews the materials. Anyone who negotiates
contracts knows that the key to controlling the final product is to prepare the first
draft, which then forms the basis for the entire negotiation. A Justice who supports
a pro-tribal interest outcome in a matter might have to work from the first cert pool
memo, which was written for an audience of a majority of Justices who disfavor
tribal interests as opposed to state interests. Given that Indian law tends to not
excite the "judicial libido," in Justice Scalia's pithy words,27 ' a Justice who starts
out in the minority might be less inclined to use his or her institutional capital to
persuade the rest of the Court to change a presumptive vote against tribal interests,
interests that do not appear to have any special supporters in the Roberts Court, a
role that Justice Blackmun most recently played.
CONCLUSION
The stated purpose of the Supreme Court's discretionary docket is to
remove "patently uncertworthy" cases from consideration. In general, the certiorari
process as currently constituted in Rule 10 appears to meet this goal. The Court
will agree to decide few "splitless" or "factbound" cases unless there are
extraordinary circumstances, such as unusual importance to the question or an
atypical lower court error.
In the field of federal Indian law, with questions often far removed from
the mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence, the certiorari process appears to
prejudice the interests of Indians and Indian tribes, who are often engaged in a
multitude of complicated legal disputes with states and state agencies.
The modem certiorari process, with its dependence on law clerks
applying the Court's Rule 10, virtually guarantees that the cert pool will denigrate
petitions filed by tribal interests. Tribal petitions, often involving the interpretation
of Indian treaties or complicated and narrow common law questions of federal
Indian law, are readily deemed "factbound" and "splitless." Conversely, the cert
pool values and perhaps better understands the interests of state and state agency
petitions. The pool's audience (a majority of the Roberts Court, including Justice
Alito) also highly understands and values the states' interests. Thus, the pool's
recommendations favor states and state agencies. The result, frankly, is that tribal
petitions on a question will almost never be favored, whereas state petitions on the
same question will often be favored.
The solutions to this discrepancy are not simple to effectuate. The Court's
commitment to the certiorari process and the cert pool is powerful and not subject
to outside interference. This commitment likely is linked to the Court's interest in
placing all cert petitions-with the notable exception of original jurisdiction
petitions-into one category.
As the occasional clerk and the occasional Justice recognize, however,
federal Indian law resists categorization into the mainstream. The certiorari
process simply does not work for federal Indian law. The cert pool, and its
271. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1556
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reflection of the political makeup of the Court, cements the prejudice that tribal
interests face in the certiorari process.
Finally, while the admonition that tribal interests should do their very best
to avoid the Supreme Court is not new, the findings of this study also demonstrate
with increased force and clarity that Supreme Court adjudication is an
extraordinarily hazardous process for tribal interests. The only cases the Court is
likely to accept are cases in which the party opposing tribal interests lost at the
lower court level. In short, a tribal victory below appears to be viewed as an
aberration that the Court is more willing to correct than not.
One very important tactical benefit to this study for both tribal interests
and those that oppose them is the perspective it gives to the certiorari process. It is
one thing to read and understand Rule 10, but it is another to see it in action as
interpreted and applied by the cert pool clerk. There is no doubt that the people
writing these memoranda are some of the finest legal minds in American law and
their assessment--colored as it is by Rule 10-of the strengths and weaknesses of
a particular petition is an invaluable tool for future litigators. If nothing else, the
list of Indian law-related certiorari petitions filed during the study period will
allow Indian law litigators to better assess their chances in the certiorari process.
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